South Carolina Law Review
Volume 61

Issue 2

Article 2

Winter 2009

On the Role and Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance
Joseph W. Yockey
University of Iowa College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Yockey, Joseph W. (2009) "On the Role and Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance," South
Carolina Law Review: Vol. 61 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol61/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Yockey: On the Role and Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance

ON TILE ROLE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS IN
GOVERNANCE
JOSEPH W. YOCKEY*
I.

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................

II.

NEGOTIATIONS IN GOVERNANCE: BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARY
O BSERVATION S ..........................................................................................

171

175
A. TraditionalViews on Governance and ShareholderPower................ 176
B. The Emergence ofInstitutionalInvestors............................................
180
C. Leveragefor Negotiations...................................................................
182

III. TIIE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS ...................................... 183
A . PotentialLim itations...........................................................................
185
1. F ree R iding......................................................
185
2. Systematic Limitations of the Proxy System ................................. 186
B. Majority Voting, Broker Voting, andAdditional Proxy Reforms ........ 187
C. The Rise ofActivist Hedge Funds .......................................................
191
D. Hedge Funds and Negotiations with Management ............................. 192

IV. EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF NEGOTIATIONS ...................... 197
A . Cost Savings ........................................................................................
199
B. Transparency,Monitoring,and Dispute Resolution ........................... 200
V. THE PROBLEM OF REGULATION FD ...........................................................
205
A. Backgroundon Regulation FD ...........................................................
206
B. Regulation FD and Board-ShareholderNegotiations........................ 210
VI. A MODEL OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GOVERNANCE: "SAY ON PAY". ............... 214
V II. C ONCLU SION ..............................................................................................

I.

218

INTRODUCTION

Private negotiations between companies and shareholders play a significant
role in corporate governance. An increasing number of shareholders are
demonstrating a preference for negotiations over such traditional forms of
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activism as shareholder proposals, proxy contests, and litigation. In recent years,
for example, shareholders at some of the largest public companies in the United
States have used negotiations with management to effectuate changes in firm
policy that include the disbandment of board committees and the modification of
executive compensation plans. These and similar results have led the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the U.S. Department of Labor, the
National Association of Corporate Directors, and other groups to all speak out in
favor of more frequent and robust negotiations between boards and
shareholders.2
The fact that board-shareholder negotiations have become a viable and
effective form of corporate interaction is due in large part to a shift in the
governance landscape. For many years, shareholders were thought to be
essentially powerless and passive within firms. 3 However, this view is rapidly
being eroded as part of a larger movement toward giving shareholders greater
voice and influence.4 Legal and economic developments-such as the emergence
of institutional investors, the trend toward majority voting, and reforms to the
proxy system-now arguably make it easier than ever for shareholders to
remove managers and trigger other governance changes. These developments in
turn provide investors with newfound sources of leverage to bring boards to the
negotiating table.

1. See STEPHEN DAVIS & STEPHEN ALOGNA, YALE SCH. OF MGMT., TALKING
GOVERNANCE: BOARD-SHAREOWNER COMMUNICATIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 5
(2008), available at http://millstein.som.yale.edu/2008%/2012%/ 20080/ 2Otalking%/20govemance /
20v2%/o20(4).pdf; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1042 (2007); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks,
Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global
Perspective, J. APPLIED FIN., Fall/Winter 2003, at 4, 10; Joann S. Lublin, New Breed of Directors
Reaches Out to Shareholders, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2008, at B4; Memorandum from Martin Lipton,
Steven A. Rosenblum & Karessa L. Cain, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Clients, Some
Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2009, at 6-7 (Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://www.wlrk.
com/docs/ThoughtsforDirectors2009.pdf, STEPHEN DEANE, RISKMETRICS GROUP, BOARDSHAREHOLDER DIALOGUE: WHY THEY'RE TALKING 3 (2009), http://www.riskmetrics.com/system/
files/private/BoardShareholder Dialogue 0.pdf; Shannon Pettypiece & Angela Zimm, Pfizer Will
Start Meetings with Largest Investors (Update5), BLOOMBERG.COM, June 28, 2007, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ajToCiEu dzU&refer=news.
2.
See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIRS. 8-9
(2004); Gillan & Starks, supra note 1, at 9-10; Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. See. & Exch.
Comm'n, Increasing Accountability and Transparency to Investors Remarks at "The SEC Speaks in
2009" (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609laa.htm;
Elisse B. Walter, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Restoring Investor Trust Through
Corporate Governance Remarks Before the Practicing Law Institute (Feb. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.see.gov/news/speech/2009/spch021809ebw.htm; S.E.C. Commissioner Backs 'Say on
Pay,' http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/ (Feb. 19, 2009, 06:06 EST).
3.
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, FiduciaryDuties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1267-68 (2008).
4.
Id. at 1307.
5.
See id. at 1275-76, 1282.
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Despite the critical importance of private negotiations to a full understanding
of corporate governance issues, the legal literature has spared little time
scrutinizing them. 6 This Article addresses this oversight by analyzing the
governance and regulatory implications that arise when institutional investors
and firms negotiate behind the scenes. It demonstrates that negotiations are
effective and provide several unique benefits that will often make them a more
desirable method for resolving intrafirm differences than traditional forms of
corporate communication. In this regard, negotiations add value by filling a
governance gap. Shareholders find that negotiations lead to greater transparency
and can be a more cost-effective and less confrontational way to push for
changes within firms when compared to proxy contests or other forms of
activism.7 For their part, many boards find that negotiations promote investor
trust and goodwill, translate into fewer shareholder Fproposals and proxy
solicitation campaigns, and preempt shareholder litigation.
This Article further contends, however, that current restrictions on corporate
speech-namely the SEC's Regulation FD 9-must be reassessed in order for
negotiations to fully realize their potential as an efficient governance device.
Regulation FD prohibits a board from selectively disclosing material information
to shareholders if it is unwilling to simultaneously disclose the same information
to the public.10 Yet, for negotiations with activist institutions to be successful,
disclosure of inside company information will often be required. If a company is
unwilling or unable to disclose such information to the public, which it may be
for any number of valid business reasons, Regulation FD stands as a substantial

6.
See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 VAND. L. REV. 453, 473-74 (2008)
(citing Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, InstitutionalInvestors and Executive Compensation, 58 J.
FIN. 2351, 2352-53 (2003)) (noting evidence that communication between firms and institutional
investors leads to reform in the area of managerial pay); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate
Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349,
356-57 (2000) (discussing the ways informal communication between shareholders and portfolio
corporations can influence changes in corporate governance); Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate
Executive Compensation Through a PartnershipLens: A Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 153, 196-97 (2000) (giving examples of institutional investors that have effected corporate
governance changes by approaching management privately); Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role
of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV.
299, 302-03 (2008) (arguing that indirect pressure on boards is likely a successful way to achieve
change in corporate governance). But cf Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional
Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 25051 (2001) (concluding that corporate governance activism in the form of shareholder proposals by
institutional investors has not resulted in a significant positive impact on firm performance).
7.
See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 1, at 5, 13; Willard T. Carleton, James M. Nelson &
Michael S. Weisbach, The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance Through Private
Negotiations: Evidencefrom TIAA-CREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335, 1336-37 (1998); Stephen J. Choi & Jill
E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds
in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 346-54 (2008).
8.
DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 1, at 5-6; Lipton, Rosenblum & Cain,supra note 1, at 6.
9.
17 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2009).
10. Id. § 243.100(a).
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obstacle to productive negotiations. This result is at odds with many of the
SEC's own stated policy positions on the need for greater transparency and
communication within firms. 11 To resolve this tension, additional regulatory
intervention may be required to ensure that negotiations remain a useful and
effective form of governance activity.
Finally, there is particular urgency to explore the largely underappreciated
governance implications of negotiations as scholars, regulators, and
policymakers continue to propose corporate law reforms in response to recent
economic events. 12 Several regulatory reforms to emerge from the global
financial crisis seem poised to generate
increasing levels of private negotiations
13
between firms and shareholders.
Part II introduces this Article's analytical framework by providing
background on the legal and economic developments that allow for boardshareholder negotiations to play a meaningful role in governance activities. Part
III examines the effectiveness of private negotiations in leading to changes in
firm policy or strategy. This part shows how corporate law continues to evolve in
ways that provide institutional investors with greater levels of power, thereby
enabling them to rely on negotiations as an increasingly effective form of
activism. Developments of particular emphasis include majority voting, the
elimination of broker voting, and the significant influence of activist hedge
funds. Part IV describes the unique benefits that accrue to investors and boards
through the use of negotiations. Part V analyzes the impact of Regulation FD on
board-shareholder dialogue. Part VI illustrates the promise of negotiations in
corporate governance by focusing on a specific test case-the rise of "say on
pay" shareholder advisory votes. These votes allow shareholders to
democratically express their approval or disapproval of the executive
compensation policies and packages at their firms. Though still relatively new
in the United States, say on pay5 votes have been required by law at firms in the
United Kingdom since 2003. The British experience with say on pay has
resulted in a dramatic increase in levels of private negotiations between boards
and institutional investors, providing both parties with many of the benefits

11. See, e.g., Aguilar, supra note 2 (arguing that regulatory reform in the current financial
crisis should be directed at restoring transparency and accountability); Walter, supra note 2
(suggesting reforms in proxy access, disclosure rules, e-proxy, broker votes, and say on pay that are
directed at increasing shareholder participation and board accountability); S.E.C. Commissioner
Backs 'Say on Pay,' supra note 2 (reporting that the SEC supports say on pay measures that
increase shareholder participation and trust).
12. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1260; Aguilar, supranote 2; Walter, supra note 2;
Ronald D. Orol, SEC OK's Proposal to Give Investors More Say on TARP Pay, MARKETWATCH,
July 1, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-oks-measure-to-give-investors-say-on-tarppay.
13. See Orol, supra note 12.
14. See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 386-396 and accompanying text.
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described in this Article. 6 As say on pay continues to gain in popularity among
American firms-with some now legally bound to provide such votes to their
shareholders as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 1-this evidence suggests that negotiations will become an even more
influential form of governance activity in United States in the years to come.
II.

NEGOTIATIONS

IN

GOVERNANCE:

BACKGROUND

AND

PRELIMINARY

OBSERVATIONS

Negotiations between boards and shareholders-particularly institutional
investors-have long been a part of corporate governance activities. Nearly
twenty years ago, mutual funds such as Fidelity first revealed that they
frequently hold private talks with the management of portfolio companies as a
way to avoid public "brawling" over governance and strategy issues. 18 Around
the same time, Exxon Corporation disclosed that it had engaged in private
discussions with a group of public pension funds to address environmental
concerns in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill near Alaska. 19 These
meetings were the catalyst for Exxon's decision to appoint an environmentalist
to its board.2 0 The private engagement between boards and shareholders even
received the attention of influential corporate attorney Martin Lipton, who, with
Professor Lorsch of the Harvard Business School, wrote in 1992 to urge U.S.
boards to hold annual, informal meetings with their largest institutional
investors.21
As the examples of Fidelity and Exxon suggest, many of the early instances
of private negotiations between boards and shareholders were initiated by mutual
and pension funds.22 Public pension funds, including CalPERS and several New
York state pension funds, as well as TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association and College Retirement Equity Fund), continue to be
particularly active in using private negotiations to encourage boards to make
governance changes voluntarily. 23 Though they often vary slightly in their
specific approaches, these institutions typically follow at least three steps when
they seek to engage a company through negotiations. First, the institution must
apply its internal evaluation criteria to the firm or firms it is thinking of targeting

16. See infra notes 397-405 and accompanying text.
17. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, sec. 7001,
§ 11(e), 123 Stat. 115,519-20.
18. Allen R. Myerson, The New Activism at Fidelity, N.Y. TINES, Aug. 8, 1993, at F15.
19. Matthew L. Wald, Exxon Head Seeks Environmentalist to Serve on Board,N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 1989, at Al.
20. Id.
21. Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY-AND TOMORROW: THE THOUGHTS OF SEVEN

LEADING PLAYERS 11, 28 (1992).
22. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1042.
23. See id.
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in order to decide whether negotiations are in its best interests and likely to
succeed.24 Some institutions look solely at governance issues at the targeted
firm, whereas others look primarily at performance benchmarks or a
combination of governance and performance. Next, the institution will usually
make informal overtures to the target company in order to begin a dialogue
related to its concerns.2 6 This step is commonly referred to as "jawboning" and
may begin with a simple letter or phone call to a company director, executive, or
investor relations officer.
At or around the same time, institutions will often submit a formal
shareholder proposal on the issues they seek to address during the jawboning
process. 28 Such proposals are filed pursuant to SEC Rule 14a-829 and are limited
to a description that is no longer than 500 words.30 Under the corporate law in
many, if not most states, shareholder proposals that ultimately reach a
shareholder vote and gain majority approval are nonbinding on the board if they
do not relate to a proper subject for shareholder action. 31 However, the
submission of a proposal at an early stage in the negotiations is often used to
alert the target company of the investor's seriousness.
The typical engagement process described above is only possible if an
institution has sufficient leverage over the target firm to open a line of
communication. That is, methods of informal influence, including private
negotiations, will only be effective if there are formal enforcement mechanisms
to back them up.32 Why might an actual or threatened shareholder proposal
prompt a board to open negotiations with an institutional investor and, in many
cases, voluntarily adopt the requested change? Several developments in
corporate law and governance help to answer this question.
A.

TraditionalViews on Governance and ShareholderPower

Since originally described by Berle and Means, the separation of ownership
and control that characterizes the modern public corporation contemplates a
governance arrangement whereby shareholders exercise virtually no control over

24. See Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 1338.
25. Id. (citing Sunil Wahal, Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, 31 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1996)).
26. See id. at 1339; Hamilton, supra note 6, at 356-57.
27. Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 1339; Hamilton, supra note 6, at 356-57.
28. Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 1338-39.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009).
30. Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 1338.
31. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REv. 129,
130 (2009) ("Shareholders have binding votes on only two things: the election of directors and
ratifying fundamental corporate changes such as mergers.").
32. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 522
(1990).
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the operations and objectives of the firms in which they have invested.33 Instead,
control is vested in the board of directors and those 34executives and managers
selected by the board to oversee day-to-day operations.
Given this framework, corporate law scholars have traditionally sought to
design governance arrangements that reduce the agency costs associated with the
division of ownership and control by aligning the interests of investors with the
incentives of managers.35 In the most basic form, shareholders, as owners, elect 36a
board of directors bound by fiduciary duties to oversee the firm on their behalf.
However, directors and officers selected by directors might shirk, steal, or
otherwise act in ways that are contrary to the interests of shareholders. 37 They
might also act to satisfy their own self-interest at shareholder expense by doing
things like creating provisions that will protect them from takeover risk,
directing corporate business to friends or family, or stacking
boards with
38
directors who give deference to the whims of management.
To be sure, corporate law generally provides shareholders with a limited set
of tools for checking potential abuses by management. For example,
shareholders may (a) vote to elect directors; (b) vote to approve major corporate
transactions such as mergers; (c) use the proxy process to offer proposals or
resolutions for a shareholder vote; (d) propose bylaw amendments;
or (e) sue to
39
management.
by
them
to
owed
duties
fiduciary
the
enforce
However, as has been well-documented by others, the monitoring devices
traditionally afforded to shareholders render individual investors relatively
powerless to enact meaningful changes in managerial behavior. 40 For one, when
shareholders are widely dispersed and individually own only a small percentage
of shares in a company, it simply does not make economic sense for individuals

33.

See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND

PRIVATE PROPERTY 78 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932) [hereinafter BERLE &
MEANS 1968].
34. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 559 (2003).
35. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,Information Costs, and Economic
Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781-83 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 308-10 (1976); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDuS. &
CORP. CHANGE 277, 277-78 (1996); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung
Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 117-18 (2009)
(citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY (1932) [hereinafter BERLE & MEANS 1932]).
36. Tung, supra note 35, at 118.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 569 (2006); Tung, supra note 35, at 118.
40. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1274-75; Black, supra note 32, at 526-29.
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to spend time, money, and energy trying to invoke corporate change. 41 There is
no incentive for any one stockholder to monitor management when she would
bear all the costs while all other shareholders free ride on the benefits. 42 In the
words of Berle and Means, "[w]hen the largest single [stockholder] interest
amounts to but a fraction of one per cent-the case in several of the largest
American corporations-no stockholder is in the position through his holdings
alone to place important pressure upon the management." 43 Thus, the reality of
widely dispersed share ownership leads to rational apathy by individual
shareholders.44
Furthermore, state and federal corporate law poses several obstacles to
shareholders who wish to use the corporate election and proxy process to
promote change in governance. The law generally "allow[s] incumbent directors
to use corporate funds to solicit shareholder proxy votes in support" of their
positions. By contrast, any individual shareholders who hope to mount a
challenge must use their own personal funds in solicitation efforts. 46 Further,
they must distribute a separate proxy statement describing only their candidate
and successfully campaign for more votes than the slate of directors proposed by
the incumbent management and described on the company's annual proxy
statement.47 This is an extremely48expensive process, both in terms of time
commitments and fiscal outlays. Once shareholders weigh the costs of
launching a proxy solicitation campaign against the chances of ultimate success,
many shareholder initiatives effectively die before they are undertaken. 49 The
end result is that shareholders actually contest very few board elections.50
Given the practical constraints on shareholder intervention and influence,
general thought indicated that it made the most economic sense for dissatisfied

41. See BERLE & MEANS 1968, supra note 33, at 76 ("The normal apathy of the small
stockholder is such that he will either fail to return his proxy, or will sign on the dotted line,
returning his proxy to the... corporation.").
42. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 9.5.2 (1986); Marcel Kahan &
Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEo. L.J. 1227, 1231 (2008).
43. BERLE & MEANS 1968, supra note 33, at 78.
44. See CLARK, supra note 42, § 9.5.2.
45. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1275 (citing BERLE & MEANS 1968, supra note 33, at
76).
46. See BERLE & MEANS 1968, supra note 33, at 76; see also Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate
Governance and the New Hedge FundActivism: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 32 J.CORP. L. 681, 686-89
(2007) (discussing the complexities involved in gaining one's own proxy).
47. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
688-89 (2007). See generally BERLE & MEANS 1968, supra note 33, at 76 (describing the process
for electing management).
48. See Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 688.
49. See id. at 693.
50. See id. at 685. For example, Bebchuk describes in his article how from 1996 to 2005,
incumbents faced rival director nominees in only 118 companies-about twelve companies per
year. Id. Furthermore, only twenty-four of the companies had a market value in excess of $200
million. Id. at 686. Only eight challengers were successful in challenging the incumbents of those
companies. Id. at 687.
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shareholders to voice their opinions through their feet. 1 That is, under the socalled "Wall Street Rule," shareholders who disagree with company decisions
may be best served by simply divesting their shares and moving on to other
investment opportunities rather than engaging in seemingly fruitless attempts to
convince the company to change its ways through the corporate election
process.52 This state of affairs has led many scholars to explore alternative ways
to address the agency cost problem of separating ownership and control within
firms. For example, some focus on board composition and structure,53 forms and
manner of executive compensation, 54 the market for corporate control, 55 the
separation of economic rights from voting rights within firms,56 the use of
57
independent directors,59
the proper understanding of fiduciary duties, 58 and the
role of private lenders.

51. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 31, at 130.
52. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
ShareholderActivism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 462 (1991); Thompson & Edelman, supra note 31, at 130.
53. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUs. LAW. 921, 923 (1999); April Klein, Firm
Performance andBoardCommittee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 300 (1998).
54.

See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE

UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, at x (2004) ("By providing a full account
of how and why boards have failed to serve their critical role in the executive compensation area,
we hope to contribute to efforts to improve compensation practices and corporate governance more
generally."); Fried, supra note 6, at 455 (suggesting that firms use a "hands-off' option for dealing
with issues of executive compensation).
55.

See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

OF CORPORATE LAW 4 (1991) ("Managers may do their best to take advantage of their investors,
but they find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they had investors' interests at

heart.").
56. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty
Voting II"Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 625, 628-29 (2008); Henry T.C. Hu &
Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership:
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J.CORP. FIN. 343, 344-45 (2007); Henry
T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 811, 815 (2006).
57. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms,
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 797-98
(2001) ("In the United States, independent boards have become common for larger
corporations... and these boards do seem to be more activist.").
58. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of
Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REv. 559, 562 (2008) (discussing the duties of good faith
and oversight in relation to director accountability); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney,
Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 834-35 (2007) (suggesting that holding
directors liable for the duty of good faith may influence director conduct); Kelli A. Alces,
Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 5),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1352595 ("It is dangerous and costly to assume that fiduciary
duties function well in the corporate context.").
59. See Tung, supra note 35, at 122.
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Arguably, the one alternative to receive the most attention in legal literature
concerns the roles and behavior of institutional investors. 60 As indicated by Berle
and Means, the traditional characterization of shareholders as essentially
powerless emerged at a time when most shareholders were individuals who held
only miniscule percentages of the shares in public companies. 61 This view no
62
longer reflects the current market. Within the last twenty years or so, the
historical profile of shareholders has changed dramatically with the emergence
of institutional investors-namely mutual, pension, and hedge funds-that hold
large blocks of stock in particular companies. 63 As a result, scholars and
policymakers have found a class of shareholders that has options besides simply64
divesting shares and exiting whenever disagreements with management arise.
Institutions can now use their ownership of large holdings to work for changes
within firms through corporate elections and other means.
B.

The Emergence ofInstitutionalInvestors

Beginning in the early 1990s, several scholars began to explore the
possibility that institutional investors could solve the rational apathy problem
and practical difficulties that result from widely diffused share ownership. 66 The
basic thought was that institutional investors, which typically hold much larger
percentages of stock than individual investors, could use their voting power,

60. See, e.g., Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1275 ("[I]nstitutional investors can take far
larger positions in particular companies than most individual investors ever could."); Black, supra
note 32, at 523-24 ("Institutional investors have grown large enough so that a limited number of
institutions own a sizeable percentage of the shares of most public companies."); Rock, supra note
52, at 449-50 ("Over the last five years, shareholder proposals, particularly proposals by
institutional shareholders, have received substantial shareholder support .... ); Romano, supra
note 6, at 175 (discussing the increasing influence of institutional investors); Lynn A. Stout, The
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 807 (2007) (discussing the
"increasing clout" of institutional investors).
61. BERLE & MEANS 1968, supra note 33, at 78 ("When the largest single [stockholder's]
interest amounts to but a fraction of one per cent-the case in several of the largest American
corporations-no stockholder is in the position through his holdings alone to place important
pressure upon the management ... ").
62. See Black, supra note 32, at 529-30.
63. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1275-77.
64. See id. at 1276.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 819 (1992) ("[I]nstitutional voice can improve corporate
performance"); Black, supra note 32, at 608 (stating that, due to the rise of institutional investors,
shareholder "apathy may not be rational after all"); Rock, supranote 52, at 448 ("As shareholdings
become concentrated in fewer and more sophisticated hands, it is tempting to conclude that
shareholders will finally be able to overcome one of the central problems that has preoccupied
corporate law for decades: the problem of collective action by shareholders.").
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expertise, and resources to ensure that the incentives of directors and managers
are aligned with the interests of the company's shareholders. 67
The first institutions to receive attention were mutual funds and pension
funds. These entities "aggregate the savings of millions of individuals into
enormous investment portfolios that buy stock" in a broad range of public
companies. 68 They have the ability to use their size and scope to buy large blocks
of stock within the companies of their choosing, and, by most accounts, now
69
own nearly two-thirds of all outstanding shares in the U.S. equities market.
Through their large holdings, institutional investors are thought to be able to
overcome the rational apathy problem presented by diffuse individual
shareholders. 70 As Professor Black explained in his seminal article on the
subject, "the model of public companies as owned by thousands of anonymous
shareholders simply isn't true. There are a limited number of large shareholders,
and they know each other. 7 1
But size and resources only go so far in explaining why institutions are wellpoised to influence corporate governance and strategy. Along with the increased
holdings of institutions, corporate law has evolved to give institutions more tools
by which they can exercise their influence over firms. A particularly significant
development came in 1992 when the SEC amended the federal proxy regulations
72
to allow large shareholders to exercise their voting power more effectively.
Prior to this amendment, "the SEC had interpreted the phrase 'proxy solicitation'
to include any communication 'reasonably calculated' to influence another
shareholder's vote. 73 This definition made it practically impossible for one
shareholder to communicate with other shareholders unless it was willing to
comply with the SEC's burdensome disclosure requirements for all proxy
solicitations.7 4 To overcome this obstacle, the 1992 amendments "exempt[ed]
from the definition of 'proxy solicitation' most shareholder
communications not
75
actually accompanied by a formal proxy solicitation.,
These amendments also gave additional guidance concerning public
statements by shareholders, indicating that items like press releases, Internet
communications, and advertisements were also outside of the scope of proxy

67.
68.

See Black, supra note 32, at 523-24; Rock, supra note 52, at 505.
Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1275.
69. See id. (citing JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 509 (6th
ed. 2007)).
70. Black supra note 32, at 608.
71. Id.at 574.
72. See Briggs, supra note 46, at 686-89.
73. Anabtawi & Stout, supranote 3, at 1276; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(k)(1)(iii) (1991)
("The terms 'solicit' and 'solicitation' include ... [t]he furnishing of a form of proxy or other
communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the
procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.").
74. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1276.
75. Id.at 1276-77.
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76

solicitations. Such developments within the proxy structure made it feasible for
institutional investors to discuss with each other their views on governance and
strategy.77 Based on the decisions reached during these discussions, they would
then be able to combine their holdings to vote a larger percentage of total shares
in a joint effort.7 8
Coordination among institutions has been further aided by the rise in
popularity of shareholder advisory services.79 These firms, best exemplified by
the activities of RiskMetrics Group (who acquired Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) in 2007), 80 provide mutual and pension funds with advice and
recommendations on how they should vote the proxies held in connection with
their portfolios. 81 Such recommendations often concern director elections,
82
antitakeover devices, and other governance matters .
When shareholder
advisory services like RiskMetrics coordinate the voting activity of a large group
of institutions, the effect is essentially the formation of a substantial "voting
block controlled, as a practical matter, by the advisory service itself," which is
similar to the way in which the 1992 amendments to the federal proxy
regulations enabled institutions to form large voting blocks.83 In the words of
Professors Stout and Anabtawi, "the widely dispersed individual shareholders of
Berle & Means' day, who routinely voted with corporate management, have
been replaced to a great extent by a single and far more independent-minded
'voter'-[RiskMetrics] .84
C. Leveragefor Negotiations
With such developments as the 1992 proxy amendments and the increasing
popularity of shareholder advisory services, many institutions soon realized that
they now possessed powerful tools for effectuating changes in the policies or
strategies of targeted firms. For example, beginning in the mid-1990s, CalPERS
became one of the most visible,,institutions to play an openly
,,85 activist role, often
being described as a "leader among activist institutions.
Through its use of
shareholder proposals and proxy fights, CalPERS began to target

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.at 1277.
See id.
Id.
Id.

80.

Id. See generally RiskMetrics Group, Company History, http://www.riskmetrics.com/

history (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing the history and development of the RiskMetrics
Group).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1277.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1278.
Choi & Fisch, supra note 7, at 315.
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"underperforming companies with poor governance practices" and then used its
influence to improve performance.
But seeking change through a formal shareholder proposal and a proxy
solicitation campaign costs institutions considerable amounts of time and money
with no guarantee of success. 87 Despite their large holdings and ability to
coordinate, institutions must still bear all the costs of a proxy solicitation
campaign while the management of the target firm may draw on corporate
funds.8 Some institutions may also prefer to keep their activism out of the public
domain for political reasons.
These considerations have led an increasing number of institutions to turn to
private negotiations with management in an effort to convince firms to make
governance changes voluntarily. 90 Boards now know that a motivated and
resourceful institution-or group of institutions-can rely on traditional
mechanisms such as shareholder proposals and proxy contests to affect corporate
change. 91 Even the mere threat of a shareholder proposal is frequently enough
leverage to motivate boards to engage in private negotiations due to their desire
to avoid the risk of subsequent public scrutiny should the proposal reach a
shareholder election. 92 This is especially true as boards become increasingly
cognizant of the risks to their reputation
posed by the aggressive nature of many
93
journalists in the financial media.
Of course, even if boards are willing to engage in negotiations, the question
remains whether the practice will be as effective as more formal methods of
activism. This is of threshold importance for activist institutions since their
stated goal is generally to effectuate desired changes in governance matters or
business strategy.
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS
The governance and regulatory climate described above suggests that
institutional investors possess the leverage to make the use of private
negotiations a viable option for affecting corporate change through the threat of
formal activism. Put differently, when shareholders want to talk to boards

86.

Id. at 315-16.

87. See Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 688-89.
88.

Id. at 690.

89. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1057; Editorial, Calpers and Cronyism, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 18, 2004, at A18; Jonathan Weil & Joann S. Lublin, Gadfly Activism at Calpers Leads to
Possible Ouster ofPresident,WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2004, at Al.
90.

Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1042.

91.

See Rock, supra note 52, at 481-83, 505.

92.

See Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 1338.

93. See generally Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/
ideoblog/2008/06/the-press-the-t.html (June 11, 2008, 11:55 CST) (discussing anticorporate bias in
the media).
94. See Romano, supra note 6, at 175.
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outside of traditional channels, they now have the muscle to get the ball rolling.
An inherent challenge in analyzing what happens once boards and shareholders
95
do engage in private negotiations, however, is that they are just that-private.
Fortunately, to assist in this effort, at least one set of scholars has gained access
to the behind-the-scenes communications between an activist institution and its
96
target companies and have shared its findings.
In one of the earliest empirical studies to examine private negotiations,
Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach focused on the activities of TIAA-CREF and
found that the fund had been highly successful in using private negotiations to
effectuate governance changes. 9 At the time the study was released in 1998,
TIAA-CREF was the largest pension fund in the U.S., "hold[ing] approximately
one percent of the total U.S. equity market., 98 Between the years 1992 and 1996,
TIAA-CREF targeted forty-five firms for the purposes of seeking one or more of
three changes in corporate governance-adoption of confidential voting,
reduction of antitakeover devices, and changes in board diversity to promote the
appointment of minority or female directors. 99 During the jawboning process,
100
TIAA-CREF proved highly successful in obtaining its desired changes.
Though it typically started proceedings with the submission of a shareholder
resolution, in most cases the fund reached an agreement prior to any formal
shareholder vote. 10 1 Once an agreement was reached, any formal proposal on the
table was withdrawn before it could appear on the publicly available proxy
statement. 102 Indeed, "[t]he possibility of resolving the issue privately" was
10 3
likely a key factor contributing to the high rate of negotiated settlements.
Though the agreements that were reached often differed slightly from the formal
shareholder proposals under submission, they "still effected the fundamental
changes" sought by TIAA-CREF." 4
All said, in 87% of TIAA-CREF's engagements, it successfully used private
negotiations to see its desired changes implemented by the target company. 10 5 In
the remainder of the cases, firms initially resisted its private pressure and
allowed the matter to proceed to a shareholder vote.10 Notably, the study
concluded that widely held public companies, as opposed to insider-controlled
firms, were generally more willing to settle matters privately. 10 7 This is likely

95.

See Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 1335-36.

96. Id.at 1336.
97.
98.

See id.
Id.at 1337.

99. Id.at 1336.
100. See id.at 1340-41.

101. Id.
102. Id.at 1341.

103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.at 1343.
See id.
Id.at 1349.
See id.
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due to the fact that directors in widely held firms will generally be "more
concerned about their reputation with potential future shareholders" than those in
insider-controlled firms and therefore will be more inclined to settle rather
10 8 than
let the matter proceed to a possible public defeat at a corporate election.
Despite the ways in which funds such as TIAA-CREF have been able to use
negotiations with management to effectuate change, certain potential limitations
must be addressed. First, for institutional investors such as mutual funds and
pension funds, lingering concerns over free riding persist. Second, the proxy
process as described above will only go so far in convincing boards that
negotiations are in their own best interests. In other words, over time, some
boards may start calling the "bluff' of activist institutions that threaten formal
action as a way to spur negotiations. These and other issues are addressed below.
A.

PotentialLimitations
1. Free Riding

Mutual funds and pension funds typically maintain highly diversified
portfolios, often meaning that any single fund manager will hold only 1% or less
of any single company's stock in the fund portfolio. Mutual funds in particular
"must comply with the diversification requirements.., of the Internal Revenue
Code" if they wish to obtain significant tax benefits.110 These requirements
specify that "50% of the assets of a mutual fund are subject to the limitations that
the fund may own no more than 10% of the outstanding securities of a portfolio
company, and that the stock of any portfolio company may not constitute more
than 5% of the value" of the fund's assets.111 Mutual funds must further comply
with the diversification requirements of the Investment Company Act12 if they
hope "to advertise themselves as 'diversified"'-viewed by most funds as
industry standard.1 13 The threshold maximums under this Act are the same as in
the Internal Revenue Code, except that the maximums apply to 75% of a fund's
holdings.!14
Holding small stakes in individual funds presents the same rational apathy
issues as the dispersed ownership of individual investors.115 That is, if an activist
institution holding a single-digit percentage of a company's stock wishes to
engage that firm on governance or strategy matters, the activist will bear all the

108. Id.
109. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1278.
110. Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1049.
111. Id.(citing Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM.
L. REv. 10, 20 (1991)).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (2006).
113. Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1049 (citing Mark J. Roe, PoliticalElements in the
Creation ofa Mutual FundIndustry, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1469, 1474 (1991)).
114. Id.(citing Roe, supra note 111, at 19-20).
115. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1050-53; Gillan & Starks, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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expense of doing so while
1 16 all other shareholders enjoy the benefits despite
remaining on the sidelines.
Free riding concerns have not stopped mutual funds and pension funds from
engaging in activism, but they have influenced their strategies when it comes to
negotiations with portfolio companies. Until recently, many of the changes
sought by institutional investors over the course of negotiations were relatively
modest, with a large percentage being focused on global governance issues
rather than firm-specific changes in business strategy.
This is due in part to
economies of scale.118 For pension fhnds and mutual funds holding diverse
portfolios, it is more economically rational for them to push for broad and widely
applicable changes, such as confidential voting, board composition, antitakeover
devices, majority voting, and executive compensation reforms, than to take on
firm decisions point-by-point.11 9 This is confirmed by a review of the changes
sought by TIAA-CREF, which, as discussed above, are related to board
diversity, confidential voting, and alterations to antitakeover measures. 120 The
focus on systematic rather than strategy-specific changes is also consistent with
the substantial 121
role shareholder advisor services play in shaping institutional
voting patterns.
2.

Systematic Limitations of the Proxy System

In addition to concerns related to possible free riding, over time some firms
have remained reluctant to privately engage institutions that seek to negotiate
with management. For example, some boards perceive activist institutions as
being only interested in self-serving governance changes, such as proposals
designed to achieve short-term profits at the expense of long-term corporate
interests. 122 Still others realize that many institutions will often be unwilling to
follow through with threats of formal action. 123 This is because, even with the
1992 proxy amendments, the proxy system still presents obstacles to institutional
activism.
In addition to cost, state corporation laws often limit the ability 125
of
shareholders to call special meetings for the purpose of voting on directors.
Shareholders generally lack the power to present their own candidates or
proposals outside of regularly scheduled shareholder meetings or action on the

116. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 1, at 8-9.
117. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1043.
118. Black, supra note 32, at 580.
119. See id. at 580-81; Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1043-44.
120. See Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 1336.
121. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1044.
122. See id. at 1083-87.
123. See id. at 1044-45.
124. See id. at 1045.
125. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2001) ("Special meetings of the stockholders
may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the
certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws.").
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part of management. 126 Moreover, shareholder proposals that ultimately reach a
shareholder vote and gain majority approval are nonbinding on the board if they
do not relate to a proper subject for shareholder action. 27 Most proposals filed
by activist institutions fall within this category.
However, as the next few sections will describe, recent and proposed
developments in corporate governance have addressed many of the concerns
raised by potential free riding and the systematic limitations of the shareholder
proposal and proxy system. Developments such as the trend toward majority
voting and the elimination of broker voting have made it considerably easier for
institutions to remove managers whom they perceive to be underperforming. As
a result, when shareholders want to negotiate, even boards that were once
reluctant are starting to realize that it will often be in their own best interests to
participate in a two-way exchange.1 28 Those firms that continue to ignore
institutions seeking to negotiate do so at their own peril. Moreover, a group of
institutions-activist hedge funds-has emerged that is not content to simply
push for broadly applicable and modest changes in strategy or policy, and which
is poised to use negotiations to effectuate substantial, firm-specific restructuring.
B. Majority Voting, Broker Voting, andAdditional Proxy Reforms
In addition to the 1992 amendments and the increasing influence of
shareholder advisory services, several developments aimed at giving
shareholders more of a voice within firms have come to fruition or appear likely
to do so in the near future. The first concerns the rising number of corporations
that now apply majority voting rules in director elections. The traditional default
rule in director elections has always been plurality voting, where the director
receiving the most votes wins an election even if he or she fails to win a majority
of votes. 129 Many institutions opposed the plurality system and engaged in
successful activist campaigns that led to a significant percentage of U.S.
corporations adopting majority voting rules. According to one study, "between
2006 and 2007, the percentage of Fortune 500 firms adopting some form of
majority voting policy rose from 20% to more than 50%. " 131 The result of
majority voting is that "withheld" votes now translate into votes affirmatively

126. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 837 (2005).
127. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 31, at 130 ("Shareholders have binding votes on
only two things: the election of directors and ratifying fundamental corporate changes such as
mergers.").
128. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 1, at 12.
129. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1282-83.
130. See John H. Biggs, ShareholderDemocracy: The Roots of Activism and the Selection of
Directors,39 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 493, 499 (2008).
131. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1283 (citing Press Release, Claudia H. Allen, Neal,
Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, Majority Voting in Director Elections-An Activist Success Story (Nov.
13, 2007), available at http://www.ngelaw.com/news/pubs detail.aspx?id=777).
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against a specific candidate. 132 The practical effect of this system is to provide
institutions with more leverage over director elections. 133 This has inspired many
firms subject to majority voting to actively reach out and engage shareholders
prior to elections so that they
can gauge investor sentiment on contested issues
134
and director performance.
A related development concerns "broker voting." On July 1, 2009, the SEC
approved amendments to New York Stock Exchange Rule 452 that limit the
ability of brokers to cast discretionary votes in director elections. 135 Brokers and
financial institutions hold close to 85% of securities traded on public exchanges
on behalf of their investor clients. 136 A large number of those investors do not
instruct their brokers on how to vote their shares. 137 Under the original language
of Rule 452, brokers were allowed to vote these investors' shares on "routine"
matters, which included director elections. 13 Because brokers generally vote in
line with management, the effect of Rule 452 has long been to give incumbent
managers a predictable block of broker votes in their favor. 139 The amendments
to Rule 452, however, no longer classify director elections as routine.140
Accordingly, the effect of the amendments will most likely be the removal of a
reliable block of promanagement votes. Though too early to tell, this should give
activist shareholders a much more realistic chance of success in mounting
challenges to incumbent directors during corporate elections.
The practical
result of the amendments will be especially significant for those companies that
now use majority voting. 142
Recent proposed changes to the proxy system also suggest that it will soon
be easier and cheaper for activist institutions to unseat directors. As mentioned
before, a large obstacle to shareholder activism is the fact that incumbent
directors may generally use corporate funds and resources in a proxy contest
whereas investors must rely on their own personal funds and must distribute a

132. Id.

133. Id.
134. See Press Release, Claudia H. Allen, supra note 131; see also Keith L. Johnson & Daniel

Summerfield, Shareholder Say on Pay-Ten Points of Confusion 3-4 (Oct. 14, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (describing efforts taken by companies to facilitate communication
with shareholders).

135. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting for
the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293, 33,300 (July 1,
2009).

136. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1282 (citing Posting of Ted Allen to Risk &
Governance Blog, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2007/05/sec-hears testimony on broker.html (May
25, 2007)).

137. Id. (citing Allen, supranote 136).
138. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend NYSE Rule 452, Exchange Act
Release No. 59,464, 74 Fed. Reg. 9864, 9864-65 (proposed Feb. 26, 2009).
139. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1282.
140. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting
for the Election of Directors, 74 Fed. Reg. at 33,296.
141. See id. at 33,300.
142. See id.
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separate proxy statement describing their own candidates. 43 A recent proposal
by the SEC, however, would allow shareholders holding a specified percentage
of shares to include their own director nominees in the company's proxy
solicitation materials. 144 Under the terms of the proposal, shareholders with at
least 1% of voting shares would be allowed to include a nominee in the
company's proxy materials
in cases where the company145is a "large accelerated
,,
filer[]" or has a market value of $700 million or greater. The share ownership
threshold increases to 3% for companies with market values between $75 million
and $700
million, and 5% for companies with market values below $75
146
million.

The proposed rule allows shareholders to aggregate holdings to meet the
relevant minimum ownership levels. 147 Shareholders must have held their shares
for at least one year 148 and must not be holding stock for the purposes of taking
control of the company. 149 With respect to nominees, companies must allow
shareholders to nominate at least one director but are not required 15
to0 allow
shareholders to nominate more than 25% of the total board composition.
Certain aspects of the SEC's proposal remain unclear, however. For
instance, the rule provides that shareholders will be able to include their
nominees in company proxy materials "unless the shareholders are otherwise
prohibited-either by applicable state law or a company's charter/bylaws-from
nominating a candidate for election as a director."1 Some have opined that this
provision is designed "to exclude nonvoting preferred shares," but it may also be
intended to give companies the discretion to "exclude certain classes 152
of
shareholders"-such as union or pension funds-from nominating directors.
In any event, the new proposal, if adopted, should better enable institutions who
meet the various ownership thresholds to engage in activism without bearing all
of the cost.
Finally, technological developments cannot be ignored as yet another
potential source for more successful activism. Electronic shareholder forums, for
instance, make it easier for large shareholders to communicate with one another

143. See supranotes 45-47 and accompanying text.
144. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046,
Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 74 Fed. Reg.
29,024, 29,035 (proposed June 18, 2009).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 29,035, 29,053.
148. Id. at 29,035.
149. Id. at 29,072.
150. Id. at 29,043.
151. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments to
Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to Nominate Directors (May 20, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-116.htm.
152. Posting of J.W. Verret to Conglomerate Blog, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/05/
the-proxy-access-rule.html (May 22, 2009).
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and coordinate their strategies. 153 Professor Gordon has further suggested that
institutional investors should stop seeking to persuade the SEC to change the
rules for proxy access and instead should focus on engaging in "e-proxy"
solicitations when they wish to nominate director candidates. 1IN The SEC's eproxy rules reduce the cost of a proxy contest by permitting persons conducting
proxy solicitations to furnish materials to shareholders by posting
155 them on an
Internet site and then notifying shareholders of their availability.
Taken individually or collectively, the foregoing developments present the
very real chance of making it easier than ever for activists to remove directors
who they feel are underperforming or operating with misaligned incentives.
Thus, from a strategic standpoint, directors who feel vulnerable to potential
removal now have additional incentives to enqage shareholders privately in an
effort to enhance their credibility and authority.
A select group of firms has already started speaking directly to institutional
shareholders in the wake of these developments-with some directors making
the initial overtures themselves. 157 Recent shareholder unrest at companies such
as Home Depot, Pfizer, and UnitedHealth led these companies to open lines of
communication with their shareholders. 158 To take one example, Bonnie G. Hill,
Home Depot's longest-serving director, has been described as the eyitome of "an
emerging breed of directors who reach out to shareholders."15 After being
criticized for missing Home Depot's 2006 annual meeting in the midst of
shareholder complaints about the pay of then-CEO Robert Nardelli, Ms. Hill met
privately with a group of investors in an effort to address their anger. 160 This
decision came after an AFL-CIO leader sent a terse letter to Ms. Hill advocating
for a closer link between executive pay and corporate performance. 161 After the
meeting, she was able to alleviate the investors' concerns by persuading her
fellow directors to disband Home Depot's executive committee and to tie162the pay
of Mr. Nardelli's successor more closely to the company's performance.

153. See Electronic Shareholder Forums, Exchange Act Release No. 57,172, Investment
Company Act Release No. 28,124, 73 Fed. Reg. 4450, 4455 (Jan. 25, 2008) (to be codified at 17

C.F.R. pt. 240).
154. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of IncreasingShareholder Power: Forget
Issuer Proxy Access andFocuson E-Proxy, 61 VAND.L. REV. 475,495-96 (2008).
155. See id. at 487. Even outside of the context of institutional investors, emerging technology
has started to lead individual investors to coordinate their typically small holdings to effectuate

governance changes. In one of the most publicized examples, an individual investor owning less
than 100 shares of Yahoo stock used "social media" tools such as blogs to gain enough shareholder
support among other individual and institutional investors to campaign successfully for the
resignation of Yahoo's CEO. DAVIS & ALOGNA, supranote 1, at 14.
156. See DAVIS & ALGONA, supra note 1, at 12.
157. Lublin, supra note 1.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.

161. Id.
162. Id.
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Ms. Hill also participated in a conference call organized by several union
pension funds to discuss their concerns about various governance matters at
Home Depot. 163 Two months later, four Home Depot directors met with
representatives of the pension funds and "proposed a larger 'town hall' to air
investor concerns. 164 At the town hall, the directors addressed questions from
approximately forty shareholders who raised governance issues such as the lack
of a separate board chairperson at the company and the company's strategy for
dealing with the downturn in the housing market. 65 After this meeting, the
Home Depot board named Ms. Hill its lead director-a
role that includes acting
166
as a "'heat shield' against dissatisfied investors."
Another company whose directors have recently started communicating
directly with shareholders is Pfizer. 167 In 2007, the global pharmaceutical
manufacturer announced that it would become the first company in the U.S. to
hold regular meetings between its board of directors and largest shareholders 168
to
discuss topics ranging from executive compensation to management practices.
For the first meeting, Pfizer invited shareholders who collectively held
approximately 35% of Pfizer's stock. 69 This built on Pfizer's existing informal
policy of forwarding every substantive shareholder communication to the board
and then sending responses.1 70 Pfizer also has no restrictions
that prevent
1 71
directors from meeting with shareholders on their own initiative.
UnitedHealth Group, Inc. has taken a similar approach and privately engages
shareholders on both an "ad hoc basis, and in a separate, formal shareholder
advisory committee on board nominations." 172 Other firms have held openinvitation shareholder meetings separate from the annual shareholder meeting,
formed informal shareholder advisory groups, and directed that management
respond to specific shareholder inquiries.
C. The Rise ofActivist Hedge Funds
Despite the developments that continue to make it easier and cheaper for
institutional investors to coordinate and influence firms, for some institutions
issues remain concerning free riding by other shareholders. 74 For one specific

163. Id.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Pettypiece & Zimm, supra note 1.

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIRS., supra
note 2, at 8.
171. See id.
172. DEANE,supra note 1,at 2.
173. See DAVIS & ALOGNA,supra note 1,at 6-7.
174. See Kahan & Rock,supra note 1,at 1050-54.
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type of institution, however, the free riding problem faced by mutual funds and
175
pension funds does not always present a significant obstacle to activism.
Hedge funds, historically lightly regulated investment funds used predominantly
by very wealthy investors, have emerged as institutions that are willing to
actively engage portfolio176
companies in order to effect substantial changes in firm
governance and strategy.
Unlike other types of funds, hedge funds generally do not hold highly
diversified portfolios. 177 They often take large positions in a handful of firms and
then use their standing as shareholders to push for aggressive wealth
maximization.1 78 This can entail applying public pressure to a portfolio
company's board, maintaining a proxy contest to unseat incumbent management,
or filing litigation against managers. Furthermore, hedge fhnds typically rely
on activism as a part of their profit-making strategy by identifying
underperforming firms ex ante and then using their stakes in those firms to bring
about the changes they seek. 180 Other institutions, by contrast, typically invest in
a wide range of firms and only then perform an analysis of which might benefit
from direct engagement.1 81 Hedge funds are also able to take advantage of the
1992 proxy amendments to form groups, described
as "wolf packs," to purchase
182
even larger percentages within chosen firms.
No longer satisfied to target only small and midsize companies, in recent
years hedge funds have bought positions in such storied corporations as
McDonald's and Time Warner. In fact, it was the targeting of Time Warner by
a group of hedge funds that led Marty Lipton ' 184
to say that "'we have gone from
the imperial CEO to the imperial stockholder.'
D. Hedge Funds and Negotiations with Management

The fact that hedge funds frequently hold large positions in a small group of
companies suggests that they are well-suited for using private negotiations to
effectuate governance changes. This has been confirmed by a recent empirical
study by researchers at the London Business School who examined the ways in
which the Hermes UK Focus Fund (HIUKFF) targets underperforming
companies and then actively engages them in private negotiations on governance

175. Id. at 1066.
176. Id.at 1062, 1067-69.
177. Id.at 1070.

178. See id.
at 1069-70.
179. Id.at 1029.
180. Id.at 1027, 1069.
181. Id.at 1069-70.
182. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1279 (citing William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and
Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1379 (2007); Briggs, supra note 46, at 692).
183. See id (citing Mara Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, Bus.WK., Feb.
20, 2006, at 72).
184. Battlingfor CorporateAmerica, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 69, 69.
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changes.1 85 HUKFF is managed by the Hermes Group, which in turn is owned
by the British Telecommunication Staff Superannuation Pension Scheme, one of
the four largest pension funds in the United Kingdom.1 86 HUKFF has been
described as a hybrid fund, but it is similar to a U.S. hedge fund in that it
addresses the problem of free riding faced by mutual funds. The trustees of
HIUKFF believed that the fund should consist primarily of shares from a group of
underperforming companies that could "be188 engaged more intensively" on a
company-by-company, issue-by-issue basis.
When it decides to engage companies, HIUKFF relies primarily on private
189
negotiations at the outset rather than the submission of shareholder proposals.
It applies three criteria when evaluating which portfolio funds to target. It asks
"whether the company is underperforming, if the fund believes it can engage the
company successfully, and whether the fund expects to obtain at least 20% more
value over current share price." 191 If all three factors are present, the fund will
invest, make private contact with the target, and open a line of communication
regarding desired changes.1 92 If the target agrees to implement the requested
changes, the fund will simply monitor the situation to ensure compliance.193 If
the targeted company opposes the changes, the situation becomes more
confrontational. 194 At that point,
195 the fund may choose to threaten a public press
campaign or takeover attempt.
Ultimately, HUKFF engaged thirty of the forty-one companies it invested in
during the period from 1998 to 2004, primarily through multiple private
meetings, telephone calls, and letters between fund representatives and CEOs,
196
CFOs, divisional managers, investment relations staff, and board members.
The fund never contacted banks or bondholders, but it did frequently
communicate with other institutional shareholders to seek their support for its
efforts. 197 However,
joint undertakings with other institutions occurred in only
19 8
three cases.

At twenty-eight of the thirty companies targeted by HUKFF, the fund
requested "substantial restructuring," such as the sale of noncore divisions or

185. Id. at 71.
186. Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of
the Hermes UK Focus Fund,22 REv. FIN. STUD. 3093, 3101-02 (2009).
187. See id.at 3095 & n.2, 3102.
188. See id. at 3102 (citing Statement of Alastair Ross Goobey, London Business School
Roundtable on ShareholderActivism in the UK, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 2006, at 8, 19).
189. Id.at 3096.
190. Id.at 3103.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.at 3103, 3111.
196. Id.at 3095-96.
197. Id.at 3108.
198. Id.
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assets.199 Primarily, through the use of direct engagement with these twentyeight companies, it achieved a success rate of over 50%.2 °° In more than half of
its engagements, the fund sought increased cash payouts to shareholders or to
replace the target company's CEO or chairman so that someone more inclined to
adopt the fund's recommendations could be appointed.20 1 These efforts were
highly successful, achieving the desired result over 64% and 75% of the time,
respectively. 2 0 2 Moreover, once the target firms made the changes, the study
found that their share prices increased substantially-by as much as 6.6%
immediately following disclosure of the change to the market.2 °3
A review of HUKFF's use of negotiations to effectuate governance changes
suggests that U.S. hedge funds-likewise positioned to solve the free riding
problems faced by other institutional investors-could follow its example and
use private negotiations to effectuate structural changes in the shadow of the
threat of activism. However, some have suggested that U.S. hedge funds tend to
avoid private forms of activism in favor of more open and public methods. °4 To
be sure, U.S. hedge fund activism often takes the shape of public shaming
campaigns aimed at a target firm.205 In one prominent example, a hedge fund
attacked the CEO of a target firm personally, saying, "It is time for you to step
down.., so that you can do what you do best: retreat to your waterfront mansion
in the Hamptons where you can play tennis and hobnob with your fellow
socialites. 20 6 One month later the CEO resigned.2 °7
This and other examples may indicate that before U.S. hedge funds will turn
to private negotiations as part of their activism, they will first need to adopt a
less adversarial mindset. However, this is not the case with all hedge funds. A
study by Professors Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy reveals that U.S. hedge
funds frequently
rely on private negotiations with management of
208
209 target
companies.
Using data of U.S. hedge fund activity from 2001 to 2006, these
scholars found the following:
[H]edge fund activists are openly hostile in less than 30% of cases
(hostility includes a threatened or actual proxy contest, takeover,
lawsuit, or public campaign that is openly confrontational). More

199. Id.at 3097.
200. See id.at 3111 & n.31.
201. Id.at 3097.
202. Id.at 3111-12.
203. Id.at 3097.
204. Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1078.
205. Becht et al.,
supra note 186, at 3095.
206. Kahan & Rock, supra note 1,at 1029 (quoting ThirdPoint Demands that Star Gas CEO,
Irik Sevin, Resigns and Returns Keys to Company Car, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2005, available at
Factiva, Doc. No. PRN0000020050214el2e00dqm) (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Press Release, Star Gas Partners, L.P., Star Gas Partners, L.P. Announces Resignation of
CEO (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.star-gas.com/releasedetail.cfn?ReleaselD=157475.
208. See Alon Brav et al.,Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J.FIN. 1729, 1745 (2008).
209. Id.at 1730.
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commonly, hedge fund activists cooperate with managers, at least at the
initial stages of their intervention, and21 achieve all or most of their stated
goals in about two-thirds of all cases. 0
One caveat does apply when comparing the activities of HUKFF and U.S.
hedge funds. As the study of HUKFF itself concludes, there are several key
differences between the legal regimes in the U.S. and U.K. that provide British
funds with additional sources of leverage to encourage private negotiations.
First, as Professor Bebchuck has noted, under U.S. law shareholders cannot
initiate changes to a company's charter. 211 By contrast, in the U.K. shareholders
may initiate changes in the basic corporate contract through a shareholder
vote. 212 A similar difference concerns the election of directors. While the U.S.
has experienced an increasing trend toward majority voting, just under half of all
corporations continue to use a plurality system where directors receiving the
most votes win regardless of whether they earn a majority. 213 In the U.K., the
default system for corporations is majority voting, making it easier for activists
to unseat incumbent management. 214 Moreover, shareholders owning at least
10% of voting stock in the U.K. have the ability to call extraordinary general
meetings at any time for the purpose of voting on the removal of directors. 215 If a
resolution seeking the dismissal of a director wins over 50% of the votes cast at
an extraordinary meeting, the director must resign.2 16 In Delaware, however,
shareholders cannot call extraordinary meetings unless authorized by express
217
provisions in their corporate charter.
The relative ease with which
shareholders in the U.K. may call special meetings and vote on the removal of
directors thus provides their targeted boards with an additional incentive to
engage funds that seek negotiations.2 18 Nevertheless, the work of Brav, Jiang,
Thomas, and Partnoy described above suggests that these systematic differences
might not be as significant of a limitation to U.S. hedge fund activism as
originally thought.
Finally, whenever one speaks of hedge fund activism, it is important to keep
in mind that some have suggested hedge funds frequently operate under conflicts
of interest. 22° Professors Anabtawi and Stout have noted that "[o]ne such
troubling scenario arises when an activist becomes a formal shareholder with

210. Id. at 1732.
211. See Bebchuck, supra note 126, at 844, 847-48.
212. Id.at 848-49.
213. See supranotes 129-131 and accompanying text.
214. Becht et al., supra note 186, at 3099.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.at 3101.
218. See id.
219. See Brav et al., supra note 208, at 1730-36.
220. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1283-92. Professors Anabtawi and Stout propose
extending the fiduciary duties traditionally owed by directors to institutional investors as a way to
protect firm interests from shareholder conflicts of interest. Id. at 1295.
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voting power while simultaneously either 'shorting' the company's shares or
entering into a derivatives contract to hedge away its economic interest., 22 1 This
in turn would make it in the hedge fund's best interest to engage in activism that
would seek governance or strategy changes designed to lower share price
values.22 2

A similar issue arises when an activist purchases securities of two companies
and then takes a position adverse to one. 223 As described by commentators, "a
hedge fund that owns shares in Company A may try to use that position to
increase the value of another position, say in Company B, rather than to
maximize the share price of Company A." 224 This scenario was well-publicized
during the narrow approval of the merger between AXA, a French company, and
MONY, a publicly held insurance corporation. 225 A group of hedge funds with
large shareholdings in MONY supported the merger because they also held
convertible debt issued by AXA, the value of which would rise substantially
once the deal went through.226
Another example to receive considerable attention in both the financial
media and the legal literature "involved the potential purchase of King
Pharmaceuticals by Mylan Laboratories., 227 Perry Capital, a hedge fund,
purchased close to 10% of Mylan stock and shortly thereafter supported the
acquisition despite the opinions of most market analysts that the asking price was
too high. 228 However, Perry was also a significant holder in King, and "had used
a derivatives contract to hedge away its economic interest in the Mylan shares it
had purchased., 229 Thus, Perry stood to reap a substantial profit even if Mylan
overpaid in its acquisition of King.230
Activist hedge funds' conflicts of interest are only just starting to become
fully apparent.
One recent empirical study found that, over a twenty month

221. Id. at 1286-87. "Shorting" refers to the practice where one investor borrows stock from a
brokerage firm and then sells it to a third party. Brigitte Yuille, Short Selling, FORBES
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortsellingl.asp (last visited
Nov. 13, 2009). After the investor has sold the stock, she must buy the stock on the open market to
replace the borrowed stock. Id. If the price of the stock has declined by the time the investor makes
her open-market purchase, she will make a profit by purchasing the shares at a price lower than the
price for which she originally sold the stock. Id. If the price of the stock increases, however, the
investor will suffer a loss when she purchases it at the higher price. Id.
222. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1287.
223. Id.
224. Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1071.
225. Id. at 1073.
226. Id. at 1073-74.
227. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1287.
228. See Scott J. Davis, Would Changes in the Rules for DirectorSelection and Liability Help
Public Companies Gain Some of Private Equity's Advantages?, 76 U. CHm. L. REV. 83, 97 n.60
(2009); Thompson & Edelman, supra note 31, at 153.
229. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1287.
230. Id.
231. Cf Briggs, supra note 46, at 695 (noting that 2005 was the first year in which "hedge
fund activism received widespread notice").
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period, of fifty-two companies in which an activist hedge fund launched a
campaign, only six cases involved what the researcher called "possibly
questionable situations." 232 In those cases, the hedge fund had a clear conflict of
interest due to investments in potentially adverse merger parties or derivative
contracts.233 However, as the researcher acknowledged, this figure may be
underrepresentative of cases involving similar conflicts.234 Hedge funds must
disclose their interests in a 13D filing only when they acquire 5% or more of a
company's securities. 235 Thus, "a competently advised fund that is truly bent on
behavior that might not do well in the sun is simply not going to purchase
enough shares to require a Schedule 13D filing. ' 2 6 As a result, when firms
negotiate with hedge funds, directors and other institutions will need to remain
cognizant of possible hedge fund motivations to ensure that the product of any
negotiations will be in the best interests of the company and shareholders as a
class.
IV. EVALUATING TiIE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF NEGOTIATIONS

With the added leverage created by developments such as majority voting
and the rise of powerful activist hedge funds, boards will frequently feel
compelled to engage those institutions that seek negotiations. The examples of
Home Depot 237 and HUKFF238 further demonstrate that negotiations can be a
highly effective way for institutions to effectuate governance changes. These
cases have prompted several regulators, policymakers, and investor interest
groups to make recent calls in favor of more frequent board-shareholder
negotiations. For instance, as the global recession dominated headlines in
October 2008, the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) released
its list of ten "Key Agreed Principles" to strengthen corporate governance. 239
The tenth principle on the NACD's list provides that "[g]overnance structures
and practices should be designed to encourage communication with
shareholders" and suggests that "boards should consider ways to engage large
long-term shareholders in dialogue about corporate governance issues and longterm strategy issues." 240 The NACD noted that such dialogue may occur through

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.at 696, 701.
See id.at 701-02.
See id.at 695.
Id. at 688.
Id.at 703-04.
See supra notes 159-166 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.

239. NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIRS., KEY AGREED PRINCIPLES

TO STRENGTHEN

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR U.S. PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES 5-12 (2008), available at
https://secure.nacdonline.org/StaticContent/StaticPages/DM/NACDKeyAgreedPrinciples.pdf.
240. Id.at 11.
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traditional channels, such as the proxy statement and annual report, but added
241
that meetings with shareholders may also be beneficial.
Additionally, the increasing willingness of firms to begin opening direct
lines of communication with shareholders inspired several to sign the Aspen
Principles on Long-Term Value Creation in April 2009.242 These principles
signed by six major corporations, including PepsiCo, Pfizer, and Xerox; seven of
the country's largest institutional investors, including CalPERS and TIAACREF; and a group of leading corporate attorneys and policy groups-commit
the signatories to holding regular talks on a wide range of governance
issues,
243
including long-term business strategy and executive compensation.
Regulators, too, have not been shy about expressing their desire for greater
transparency and more communication within firms. The U.S. Department of
Labor has urged pension funds to speak regularly with management at portfolio
companies.
Several commissioners with the SEC have spoken publicly of the
need for greater levels of communication between firms and shareholders. 245 The
SEC itself has also proposed several measures aimed at promoting
communications between firms and shareholders, including a rule that would
require companies to disclose whether they have processes in place for allowing
shareholders
to communicate directly with board members or officers, and if not,
24 6
why not.
In light of the increased attention being paid to board-shareholder
negotiations, an obvious question arises as to what benefits, if any, do
shareholders or boards accrue by relying on negotiations over other forms of
activism? For many institutional investors and boards, private negotiations fill a
gap in traditional governance activities. They result in an exchange of
information that has the potential to resolve differences and prevent resort to
more formal, confrontational, and expensive forms of activism like proxy
contests or litigation.247 For their part, hedge funds have the capability to use

241. Id.
242. See THE ASPEN INST.,

LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION:

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR

CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (2007), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/
files/content/docs/pubs/Aspen Principles with signersApril_09.pdf (listing current subscribers to
the Aspen Principles).
243. Id. § 2.
244. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 1, at 9-10 ("[T]he Labor Department now encourages
pension funds to be active in monitoring and communicating with corporate management if such
activities are likely to increase the value of the funds' holdings.").
245. See Aguilar, supra note 2; Walter, supra note 2.
246. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIRS., supra note

2, at 6-7.
247. See Strategies for Dealing with Shareholder Proposals, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
COMMENT. (Georgeson Inc. & Latham Watkins LLP, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2008, at 2 [hereinafter
Strategies for Dealing with Shareholder Proposals], available at http://www.lw.com/upload/
pubContent/pdf/pub2408_1.pdf ("[M]any shareholder proponents are not in for a fight but want to

negotiate.").
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behind the scenes negotiations to enact substantial structural changes in target
firms. 248 These and other potential effects are discussed below.
A.

Cost Savings

The activities of TIAA-CREF and public pension funds suggest that private
negotiations provide certain key benefits from the perspective of both
institutional investors and target boards. For one, the specific ways in which
institutions use private negotiations to influence management, including
telephone calls, letters, and in-person meetings, are all relatively low cost.24 9 Not
only does this make them feasible for smaller funds that do not have the
necessary resources for more formal engagement processes, but it also makes
them attractive to all firms that wish to avoid the cost and time associated with
shareholder proposals or litigation.
Reliance on private negotiations over litigation or proxy
250 contests will also
often save on the need to hire outside advisors and counsel. This is especially
important for public pension funds, which typically do not have a separate
budget for corporate governance activities. 251 In practice, cost savings resulting
from a preference for negotiations may be influencing shareholders' allocation of
resources in activist pursuits. One study of public pension funds found that these
institutions either meet privately with management or engage in written
correspondence 35.9% and 46.2% of the time, respectively. 252 By contrast, the
same funds only sponsor shareholder proposals
or solicit votes on proposals
253
17.5% and 15% of the time, respectively.
In addition, through direct engagement, boards have also experienced cost
savings in the form of an overall reduction in the number and frequency of
shareholder proposals and proxy fights. 254 As the activities of TIAA-CREF and

248. See, e.g., Becht et al., supra note 186, at 3125-26 ("A high proportion of [HUKFF's]
interventions [are] successful and result[] in substantial shareholder gains, particularly in response
to restructurings and board changes.").
249. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 7, at 326-28.
250. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1050 ("Fund managers first have to identify a
company that would benefit from activism and develop a strategy for the company that would raise
its share price. Then fund managers have to pressure the company's management to adopt the
strategy. All of this consumes significant resources, both in-house and from hiring outside

advisors.").
251. Choi & Fisch, supra note 7, at 348 (reporting that less than 20% of pension finds
maintain a separate budget for activism).
252. See id. at 326.
253. See id. at 327.
254. See, e.g., Memorandum by David A. Katz, Partner & Laura A. McIntosh, Consulting
Attorney, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Corporate Governance Update: Shareholders Focused
on Stability in Proxy Votes 1 (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
files/2008/11/shareholders-focused-on-stability-in-proxy-votes.pdf ("The declining number of
shareholder proposals brought to a vote can be attributed to improved communication between
companies and shareholders as well as, to a lesser extent, a decreased interest in pursuing (or ability
to carry out) a governance agenda in the face of economic upheavals.").
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CalPERS indicate, activist funds often submit proposals to alert a target
255
company of their desire to open lines of communication.
These resolutions are
typically withdrawn once the institution perceives a willingness on the part of the
target to engage in an informal dialogue. 256 For example, in 2007, 665
shareholder proposals were submitted in the United States and just under half
failed to reach a vote.257 At least one market analyst contends that the steadily
increasing number of withdrawn proposals is due partly to "frank dialogue"
between activist investors and boards.258 A leading corporate law firm has
accordingly advised its director-clients to consider engaging in private
negotiations with activists in light of the declining number of shareholder
proposals that ultimately reached a vote in recent years. 259 As described in a
client memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, "[o]ne of the primary
lessons to emerge from the 2008 proxy season 'is260 that effective companyshareholder communication does make a difference."
B.

Transparency,Monitoring,and Dispute Resolution

For shareholders, particularly institutional investors, private negotiations
also have considerable promise with respect to their ability to monitor the
alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder interests. For institutions
to be able to effectively serve as monitors within firms, in many cases they will
need access to inside information about company policies or strategies. Inside
information is often confidential and more appropriate for one-on-one private
meetings-with appropriate safeguards-as opposed to inclusion on an annual
report or proxy statement.
For example, in order for boards and shareholders to engage in meaningful
negotiations on executive compensation policies and procedures, shareholders
will often need to have access to inside information that describes "performance

255. See, e.g., Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 1339 ("With many activist
funds, including TIAA-CREF, a proxy resolution is sent to the targeted firm simultaneously with

the effort to initiate a dialogue.").
256. See CORPORATE SEC'Y & GEORGESON INC., ARMING YOURSELF AGAINST ACTIVISTS,

at ii (2008), available at http://www.georgesonshareholder.com!usa/download/news/Corporate_
SecretaryArming-Yourself June08.pdf ("Although the number of activist proposals has soared
in the past few years, so has the number of settlements.").
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Katz & McIntosh, supra note 254, at 3 ("This season saw the practical impact of
effective and improved communication in reducing the number of proposals that were brought to a
vote and the amount of support that proposals received.").
260. Id. at 3.
261. "Corporate governance scholars and policymakers focus primarily on relations among
firm managers and equity holders, relying on corporate law arrangements to align managers'
incentives with shareholder interests .
l...
Tung, supra note 35, at 124.
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targets and peer benchmarks." 262 Such information is generally treated as
competitive information and not included in the standard compensation
disclosures mandated by the SEC.263 Without this information, however, it will
264
be difficult for boards and shareholders to reach a consensus on pay packages.
Designing efficient compensation must be crafted on a firm- and individualspecific basis to provide managers with proper incentives. 265 This likely explains
why, of all activists, hedge funds have been more proactive than other
institutions in seeking board representation, even if only minority
representation. 266 They appear driven to be able at least to present their views on
governance and strategy issues, even if their votes are nonbinding.
Further, by simply explaining their reasoning during the course of
negotiations, boards will often be able to stave off proxy contests or litigation.
As a leading law firm recommends, engagement also does not require waiting
until crises develop. 267 Communicating with shareholders throughout the year
will help both boards and shareholders gain a better understanding of the issues
that each side considers important.269268 This will enable boards to predict what
issues might lead to confrontation.
Then, by engaging in private negotiations
directly with shareholders outside of the formal context of a shareholder
resolution, directors may discover ways to modify their plans or procedures in
such a manner as to obviate an activist's desire to submit a proposal or to engage
in other formal methods of confrontation in the first place. Returning again to
the example of executive pay, firms benefit through negotiations by obtaining
feedback on remuneration policies, thereby "enabling them either to revise plans,
better anticipate and perhaps preempt resistance, and/or manage risks of
opposition."2 1 This may even be accomplished without necessarily giving in to

262. See Edward Labaton & Ethan Wohl, Selective "Say-on-Pay" the Best Remedy,
ExECuTIvE CouNs., Nov./Dec. 2008, at 18, 19 ("By design, even the best compensation reports do

not allow shareholders to fully grasp the financial impact of compensation arrangements because
key metrics, such as performance targets and peer benchmarks, are treated as competitive

information and often are not disclosed.").
263. Id.
264. See id.
265. Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2007/04/
sayonpay.html (Apr. 21, 2007, 07:44 CST) ("Efficient compensation must be crafted on an
individual-by-individual and firm-specific basis to provide the right incentives and attract the best
people.").
266. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 7, at 318-19.
267. See, e.g., Strategies for Dealing with Shareholder Proposals, supra note 247, at 1
("Timing should always be monitored carefully as the company is considering and pursuing its
alternatives because its strategies may change depending on where it is in the process.").
268. See id. at 4.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 2-3.
271. Stephen Davis, Does "Say on Pay" Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation
Accountable 20 (2007) (unpublished policy briefing draft, on file with the Yale School of
Management), available at http://millstein.som.yale.edu/Policy /20Briefmg%/ 20No /201%O20'Say
o20ono20Pay'.pdf.
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more demands than those with which the board is comfortable. 272 Moreover,
managers are not infallible. An institutional shareholder with significant
resources may be able to offer expertise that causes a board to see an issue in a
273
different strategic light.
Resolving differences through private negotiations
may then save the parties from resorting to lengthy proxy campaigns or litigation
as each side attempts to explain its viewpoints.
In the case of preempted
litigation, negotiations would provide the added benefit of lessening the burdens
on an already overstrained court system.
If nothing else, corporate attorneys note that a willingness to enter
negotiations may buy the target firm additional time to study the issues raised by
the activist. 275 Then, based on a deeper analysis of the issues, the firm can
attempt to use supporting data or memoranda in its efforts to persuade the
shareholder to drop the matter altogether. Indeed, as discussed previously, the
legitimate efforts to engage shareholders by several boards have led to a
significant number of shareholder proposals being withdrawn prior to their
publication in a proxy statement. 276Should a board be able to convince the
proposal's proponent-or another influential investor-that the proposal is not in
the best interests of the company, the firm might then be able to rely on that
institution's help in convincing others to vote against the original proposal even
if the deadline for withdrawing a proposal from the annual proxy statement has
passed.277
If, however, private negotiations fail to resolve the matter raised by a
shareholder proposal, they still might be of use to the targeted firm. As
mentioned previously, shareholder advisory services play a key role in the voting
activities of investors. 278 Attorneys have found that directors who privately
negotiate with the proponent of a shareholder proposal will later be able to
explain to shareholder advisory services and other institutional investors that
they openly discussed the matter with the proponent, but, in their exercise of
business judgment, they could not comply without putting corporate interests at
risk.279 By fully explaining the basis for its position to RiskMetrics, as one
example, a board may be able to sway the advisory service's recommendation
when the time comes for a corporate vote.
On the other hand, if a director believes a shareholder advisory service might
recommend voting against her stay on the board, private and sustained outreach
to key shareholders might make them less likely to simply follow the service's

272. See Strategiesfor Dealing with Shareholder Proposals,supranote 247, at 2.
273. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIRS., supra
note 2, at 9.
274. See Strategiesfor Dealing with Shareholder Proposals,supra note 247, at 2.
275. Id. at 3.
276. See supranotes 254-260 and accompanying text.
277. See Strategiesfor Dealing with Shareholder Proposals,supra note 247, at 3-4.
278. See supranotes 79-84 and accompanying text.
279. Strategiesfor Dealing with Shareholder Proposals,supra note 247, at 3.
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recommendations without question. 2 8 That is, if activists feel as though their
views are valued by a firm, they may be less inclined to use their new found
sources of authority before at least hearing the board's position. Thus, in the
words of Stephen Davis and Stephen Alogna, "informed investor[s] .. .might
vote 'yes' even when their proxy advisor counsels 'no.' ' 2 8 1 This should be of
special interest to vulnerable directors in light of data showing that at least one
institutional investor votes in accordance
with the recommendations of its
2 82
advisory services in 75% of votes.
Even if boards and shareholders are unable to agree on every issue, simply
enhancing corporate transparency through private communications will likely
have several additional knock-on effects. Some activists simply want to be
heard. 283 If a board is unwilling to engage them privately on the issues they raise,
however, these shareholders may proceed to threaten a proxy battle or engage in
an aggressive public relations campaign. 284 In one recent example, activists
successfully launched a withhold vote campaign against the chair of
ExxonMobil's public issues committee 285
after he refused to meet with them to
change.
climate
to
relating
issues
discuss
Of course, boards may face some practical difficulties if they privately
engage shareholders in negotiations. For example, shareholders may begin to
feel entitled to frequent meetings with directors, and if turned down, they may
use more aggressive mechanisms, such as proxy contests, litigation, or public
286
shaming.
If meetings become too frequent, however, companies will be forced
to spend considerable time and resources preparing for and participating in them,
287
which in turn will draw attention away from corporate operations.
To
counteract these concerns, firms may wish to follow the examples of Home
Depot and Pfizer, which have designated specific directors to handle initial
negotiations with shareholders. 28 Further, "to protect against any perception of
delegation of power to investors," boards may wish to take steps that will clarify
"the informational nature of the meetings with shareholders." 289 Thus, when
UnitedHealth created a shareholder advisory committee on director nominations,
it provided notice to all participating shareholders, stating that "'[a]ll viewpoints
expressed in the advisory committee are advisory in nature only and the

280. DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 1, at 13-14 ("[One advantage of board and shareholder
communication is e]nhancing the prospect that shareowners will exercise independent judgment
when deciding how to cast their votes at a company's annual meeting.").
281. Id.at 14.
282. Id.at 13-14.
283. See CORPORATE SEC'Y & GEORGESON INC., supra note 256, at v.
284. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1297-98.
285. CORPORATE SEC'Y & GEORGESON INC., supra note 256, at v.

286.
287.
288.
289.

Lipton, Rosenblum & Cain, supra note 1, at 6.
See id.
See supranotes 157-171 and accompanying text.
DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 1, at 13.
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nominating committee
and board.., are under no obligation to follow any such
290
viewpoints."
A final issue that boards and institutions must be aware of when engaging in
private negotiations is the possibility of conflicts of interest. The potential for
conflicts does not definitively override the many benefits of negotiations, but it
does suggest that the parties must go into any private engagement with their eyes
open. Individual shareholders will often have differing opinions about how a
firm should be operated and to what end.292 This does not present potential
problems so long as the motivation is not the economic self-interest of one
shareholder to the detriment of other shareholders. However, several types of
shareholders and transactions raise such concerns.293
For example, mutual funds often hold interests in companies where they also
manage a corporate pension fund.294 These fhnds may feel that their corporate
pension fund operations-a significant source of revenue-will be at risk if they
argue too aggressively against the decisions of company management.295 Indeed,
mutual fund managers have indicated that their corporate pension fhnd business
would be put at risk by simply voting against 296
management or by expressing an
interest in reforming executive compensation.
Mutual funds may297also suffer
from a conflict based on their relationships with fund beneficiaries.
Many are
298
affiliated with other financial institutions, such as insurance companies.
Managers at these funds may fear upsetting 2Xresent or future clients of the
affiliated institutions through activist behavior.
Public pension fhnds raise particular conflict concerns. For example, public
pension funds are often cast in the middle of disagreements between labor and

290. Id.(quoting UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, NOMINATING ADVISORY COMMITTEE DESCRIPTION
2, http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/about/AdvisoryCommitteeDescription.pdf
(last visited
Nov. 13, 2009)).
291. See Anabtawi, supra note 39, at 564 ("[S]hareholders have significant private interests,
[and] it becomes apparent that they may use any incremental power conferred upon them to pursue
those interests to the detriment of shareholders as a class.").
292. See id.
293. See id.at 564-65; see also Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1284 (suggesting that
fiduciary duties should be extended to interested activists who use their influence to promote a
specific transaction that enables them to capture a personal economic benefit not available to
shareholders generally).
294. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1055.
295. See id.
296. Id.at 1055-56 (citing Jennifer Levitz, Do Mutual Funds Back CEO Pay?, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 28, 2006, at C1; William Baue, Biting the Hand That Feeds: Mutual Fund Ties to Corporate
Clients Can Affect Proxy Voting, SOCIALFUNDS, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.socialfunds.com/news/
article.cgi/article 1659.html).

297. Id.at 1054.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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management. 30 In one high profile example of this type of conflict, CalPERS
actively campaigned to have the CEO of Safeway, Inc., Steven Burd, removed
from his position. 30 1 At the time, Burd was unwilling to give into certain
concessions demanded by the United Food & Commercial Workers Union, a
labor union representing grocery workers.3 °2 During the course of events,
however, it became known that the campaign to remove Burd had been
orchestrated by CalPERS's president, Sean Harrigan, who also worked in an
official capacity for the United Food & Commercial Workers' Union.3 °3 Once
Harrigan's conflict was revealed, Burd survived the attempt to remove him.304
However, CalPERS was perceived to have been working on behalf of the union,
rather than its entire class of beneficiaries, in the effort to gain the labor
concessions resisted by management. 305
Public pension funds also raise the concern that they are susceptible to
undue political influence. 30 6 The boards of trustees of these funds are usually
comprised of gubernatorial appointees, elected officials, and representatives
elected by fund beneficiaries. 30 7 These individuals may be subject to pressures
placed on them by constituents who might have diverging interests, and thus
they may be tempted to pursue political rather than investment goals.308
Accordingly, as with hedge funds, firms and other shareholders must remain
cognizant of possible conflicts of interest.
V. THE PROBLEM OF REGULATION FD
Despite the many advantages that negotiations provide to shareholders
seeking to engage management, proponents of the practice can overlook a
significant regulatory barrier: the SEC's Regulation "Fair Disclosure"
(Regulation FD). 30 9 This part addresses that concern.

300. See, e.g., Calpers and Cronyism, supra note 89 (observing that CalPERS's board of
trustees is focused on satisfying political goals through the fund's investments); Weil & Lublin,
supranote 89 (describing CalPERS's involvement in a labor dispute).
301. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1285-86.
302. See id. at 1286.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See id.
306. See, e.g., Calpers and Cronyism, supra note 89 (discussing the political influences on
CalPERS).
307. Roberta Romano, PublicPension FundActivism in CorporateGovernance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REv. 795, 800-01 (1993).
308. Kahan & Rock, supra note 1, at 1059; Romano, supra note 307, at 801.
309. 17 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2009).
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Backgroundon Regulation FD

For negotiations to produce the types of benefits described in this Article,
boards and shareholders must be able to freely engage in a two-way exchange of
information. For example, to stave off proxy fights or litigation, boards may
need to explain their positions to satisfy the concerns of shareholders. 3 This
will likely require the use of supporting data or information-some of which
may be confidential. Similarly, for institutional investors to be able to serve as
effective monitors of director behavior, the calculus must include the level of
information that they have access to regarding the issues facing their firms.3 11
However, the degree to which directors may freely disclose information
during the course of negotiations is substantially limited by the SEC's
Regulation FD.312 Regulation FD, in many circumstances, prohibits boards from
disclosing material nonpublic information to shareholders if they are 313
unwilling
or unable to disclose the same information to the general public.
It was
enacted out of concerns over the trading in securities following an issuer's
selective disclosure of information to certain market participants. 3 Prior to its
enactment, "issuers of publicly held securities often would selectively disclose
material nonpublic information to analysts and other securities market insiders in
advance of any broad public announcement., 315 Issuers selectively disclosed
information typically to assist the parties in making more accurate assessments
of the disclosing company's present or future performance. 316 Critics of this
practice had claimed that "[s]uch 'selective disclosure' . . . put small investors at
a disadvantage to the analysts, brokers, and institutional investors who were

310. See CORPORATE SEC'Y & GEORGESON INC., supranote 256, at ii; Strategiesfor Dealing
with ShareholderProposals,supra note 247, at 2.
311. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 1, at 7 ("[L]arge institutional investors can convey
private information that they obtain from management to other shareholders.").
312. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7787, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590,
72,591 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249) ("Regulation
FD, therefore, would require that: (1) When an issuer intentionally discloses material information, it
do so through public disclosure, not through selective disclosure; and (2) whenever an issuer learns
that it has made a non-intentional material selective disclosure, the issuer make prompt public
disclosure of that information.").
313. Id.
314. Id. at 72,591-92. See generally ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL
STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW, WHAT YOU CAN DO To FIGHT

BACK 87-104 (2002) (describing the history and purpose of Regulation FD).
315. Marc I. Steinberg & Jason B. Myers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden Issues of the
Securities andExchange Commission'sRegulation FD, 27 J. CORP. L. 173, 173 (2002).
316. See William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 932-34 (2005).
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routinely getting advance information on corporate earnings ahead of the rest of
'
the market."317
Another significant issue in the mind of the SEC was the concern over
possible analyst bias.318 For example, there was a fear that some analysts were
making overly optimistic assessments of firm prospects in order to keep those
firms happy, thereby ensuring 319a continued stream of valuable selective
disclosure of inside information.
Managers whose compensation or bonuses
might be tied to short-term stock performance would then seemingly be
presented with incentives to "bribe" analysts with selective disclosure to achieve
positive recommendations.
Of course, a company insider who buys or sells an issuer's own securities on
the basis of material nonpublic information may be liable for insider trading
pursuant to the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated thereunder. 32 The same is true in
certain cases where an issuer discloses material321nonpublic information to a third
party who then trades in the issuer's securities.
However, based on the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in the cases of
Chiarella v. United States322 and Dirks v. SEC,323 trading resulting from the
selective disclosure of material nonpublic information to a market professional
or other insider does not always run afoul of the insider trading laws. 32 These
and other cases hold that an insider does not violate Rule lob-5 when she
discloses confidential information for the benefit of her firm and there is no
breach of duty to the firm. 325 Thus, when an insider discloses nonpublic
information to help analysts or others make more accurate forecasts, the insider
will not violate insider trading laws as 326
long as the motivation was to help the
firm and not to obtain a personal benefit.

317. LEVITT, supra note 314, at 87; see also Michael Schroeder & Randall Smith, Disclosure
Rule Cleared by the SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2000, at C1 (quoting former SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt in saying that "these practices defy the principles of integrity and fairness").
318. Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 533, 539-40 (2002).

319. Id.
320. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
321. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659-61 (1983).
322. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
323. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
324. See id. at 660 ("[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty
to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know
that there has been a breach."); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 ("[O]ne who fails to disclose material
information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty

to do so.").
325. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.
326. See id.
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The SEC felt that this jurisprudence created a gap in the regulation of insider
trading and responded with the enactment of Regulation FD in October 2000.327
Regulation FD does not characterize the practice of selective disclosure as
fraudulent under Rule lob-5.328 Rather, it was enacted pursuant to the SEC's
power to "prescribe [rules] as necessary, or appropriate for the proper protection
of investors and to insure fair dealing.",329 Regulation FD is lengthy but provides
in pertinent part the following:
Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any
material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to
any [enumerated] person.., the issuer shall make public disclosure of
that information ... (1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional
disclosure; and (2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional
disclosure.330
As described by former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt, "[t]he intent of Reg FD is
really quite simple. If a company wishes to pass on market-moving
information,
331
it must share the news with everyone at the same time."
Though the basic requirements of Regulation FD are fairly straightforward,
several aspects warrant closer examination. First, the term "issuer" is defined to
include all reporting companies as well as companies that have a class of
securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act.332 This definition
excludes foreign private issuers and foreign governments.333 When Regulation
FD refers to "any person acting on [the issuer's] behalf,' '334 it means "any senior
official of the issuer .... or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer
who regularly communicates with [certain enumerated persons]. 335 This
category excludes "[a]n officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer who
discloses material nonpublic
information in breach of a duty of trust or
336
confidence to [an] issuer."

327. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7787, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590,
72,590-92 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249); Steinberg
& Myers, supranote 315, at 174-77.
328. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2009).
329. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006).
330. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a).
331. LEVITT, supra note 314, at 88.
332. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b).
333. Id.
334. Id.§ 243.100(a).
335. Id.§ 243.101(c).
336. Id.
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In addition, as indicated above, Regulation FD only applies when
information is selectively disclosed to certain enumerated persons.
From the
SEC's perspective, these persons are "those who would reasonably be expected
to trade securities on the basis of the information or provide others with advice
about securities trading., 338 They include: (1) brokers or dealers, or their
associates; (2) investment advisors and institutional investment managers; (3)
investment companies and their affiliates; and (4) holders of the issuer's
securities, where it is "reasonably foreseeable that the [holder]
will purchase or
339
sell the issuer's securities on the basis of the information.,
340
Regulation FD specifically excludes from its coverage temporary insiders,
"person[s] who expressly agree[] to maintain the disclosed information in
confidence,, 341 credit ratings agencies, 342 media outlets, government agencies,
and persons in the ordinary course of business, such as vendors, customers, or
strategic partners. 343 With respect to temporary insiders and individuals who
agree to maintain the disclosed information in confidence, Regulation FD's
restrictions seem superfluous in light of the fact that trading by those persons
will generally come within the purview of the Supreme Court's existing insider
trading jurisprudence.344 Finally, and with certain caveats, the Regulation does
not apply to disclosures made in connection
with a registered offering of
345
1933.
of
Act
Securities
the
under
securities
Failure to comply with Regulation FD subjects an issuer to a wide range of

possible sanctions, "including cease-and-desist orders, civil injunctions, and

337. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange
Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,719 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 240, 243, 249).
338. Id.
339. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i)-(iv).
340. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 (stating that a temporary
insider is "a person who owes the issuer a duty of trust or confidence").
341. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii).
342. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(iii). With respect to credit rating agencies, the exception applies
"provided the information is disclosed solely for the purpose of developing a credit rating and the
entity's ratings are publicly available." Id.
343. See id.§ 243.100(b)(2)(iv).
344. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) ("The 'misappropriation
theory' holds that a person commits fraud 'in connection with' a securities transaction, and thereby
violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information."); Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 660 (1983) ("[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not
to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to
the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know
that there has been a breach."); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) ("[O]ne who
fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only
when he is under a duty to do so.").
345. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(iv).
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monetary penalties." 346 Violations do not give rise to Rule lob-5 liability or
private causes 347
of action, but they are subject to SEC enforcement actions and
investigations.
B. Regulation FD and Board-ShareholderNegotiations
In the context of private negotiations between boards and shareholders,
Regulation FD's disclosure requirements have the potential to serve as a
significant roadblock. As discussed above, productive negotiations contemplate
at least a two-sided exchange of information. Access to inside company
information is often a crucial requirement for shareholders to be able to monitor
board behavior effectively, or for boards to be able to convince shareholders that
formal confrontation is unnecessary. For example, boards may wish to disclose
confidential information during shareholder negotiations in an attempt to
preempt litigation or a proxy contest.
However, in many situations where a board might otherwise be comfortable
sharing confidential information as part of private negotiations, it may
nonetheless be unwilling to publicly disclose the same information out of a
concern that such disclosure would impair corporate interests. 348 As indicated in
the context of negotiations over executive compensation, much of the
information that would enable boards and shareholders to have a meaningful
dialogue is highly competitive and confidential information. 349 Yet, a board may
be forced to refrain from sharing this type of material with an institution due to
the risk of a Regulation FD investigation or enforcement action. Viewed in this
light, Regulation FD can be seen to interfere with the exercise of a board's
business judgment as to the best way to interact with an activist institutionsomething traditionally left to the law of the state of incorporation.350
The chilling effect of Regulation FD has already been observed in
practice. 351 As research from the Yale School of Management has shown,
corporate attorneys expressly advise director-clients who wish to speak with
shareholders in informal private settings of the need to limit the scope of their
communications in accordance with Regulation FD's parameters. 352 This advice
includes the option of foregoing private communications altogether due to the

346. DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS,
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 552 (2d ed. 2008).

SECURITIES

347. See id.
348. See, e.g., DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 1, at 10 ("'Our discussions with shareholders
concerning corporate governance do not touch on financial or earnings metrics. We simply do not
discuss any material non-public information during such communications."').
349. See Labaton & Wohl, supranote 262, at 19.
350. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 (1971) ("The local law of the
state of incorporation will be applied to determine the right of a shareholder to participate in the
administration of the affairs of the corporation .... ").
351. See, e.g., DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 1, at 10.
352. See id.
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risk of SEC enforcement activities or to participate in only cursory
discussions.353 Many companies, therefore, refuse to disclose any information
that could be construed as material and nonpublic, while others will participate
354
solely in "listen-only" sessions when meeting informally with shareholders.
According to one attorney, "'executives ... have to make sure they don't say
anything that could move the stock."' 355 At least one company has stated that it
will not disclose to shareholders financial performance data for the present
quarter, "internal financial projections, internal strategic plans, significant
undisclosed" contracts, "business development opportunities," or expectations
regarding future dividend payments or stock repurchase programs. 356 For those
boards that wish to conduct private communications with shareholders despite
the litigation risks posed by Regulation FD, corresponding transaction costs
necessarily rise due to the need for tailored regulatory357
compliance programs and
the presence of counsel in meetings with shareholders.
The foregoing scenarios reveal a source of tension among several of the
SEC's own stated policy goals. On the one hand, several SEC Commissioners
have spoken forcefully in favor of rules and regulations that would promote
more robust interaction between shareholders and directors. 358 Proposed SEC
rules further demonstrate that the Commission is committed to encouraging
greater levels of informal corporate communication. 359 However, by expressly
limiting the quality of information that firms will be able to share with
shareholders in light of the enforcement risks presented by Regulation FD, the
SEC's own regulations could very well be standing in the way of realizing the
Commission's hopes for greater transparency within firms. Put differently,
Regulation FD poses the very real threat of interfering with the business
judgment of directors who might otherwise desire to communicate more freely
and openly with their shareholders.
The SEC has several possible responses. First, the Commission might argue
that many pieces of information exchanged during negotiations will focus solely
on governance procedures and thus would not be considered material for
purposes
Regulation
FD.in3 60making
This is anot
a satisfactory
response
because of the
difficulty of
boards
will face
qualitative
assessment
of information
ex

353. See id.
354. See id. at 10-11.
355. Id. at 10 (quoting Melissa Klein Aguilar, Best Practicesfor Talking Under Reg FD,
COMPLIANCE WK., Feb. 26, 2008).
356. Id. at 17.
357. See id. at 9-10.
358. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
359. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIRS., supra

note 2, at 5-7 (summarizing recent changes to rules and regulations governing corporate

communications).
360. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2009).
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ante when asked to engage in a dialogue with shareholders. 361 Despite the
subjective intent of the parties, it will be hard to remain confident that a topic is
purely outside of Regulation FD's scope if items such as earnings reports or
forecasts are discussed. 362 Indeed, as mentioned above, when those types of
information are discussed, many corporate attorneys advise their director clients
to limit the scope of negotiations in light of Regulation FD concerns. 363 This
should not come as much of a surprise given that the SEC has historically taken
an extremely strict view of what constitutes a material statement in the context of
Regulation FD.364
Another possible response concerns a potential safe harbor within
Regulation FD itself. Regulation FD provides that its disclosure requirements are
not triggered if the party who receives nonpublic material information agrees to
maintain any private disclosures
in confidence and to refrain from trading on the
365
basis of the information.
However, this option too is unsatisfactory in the
context of negotiations. Many institutions will most likely be reluctant to agree
to confidentiality terms given that they could open the door for an insider trading
investigation or prosecution under the so-called "misappropriation theory." In
United States v. 0 'Hagan366 the United States Supreme Court held that a person
violates Rule lOb-5 "when he misappropriates confidential information for
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information., 367 The key for 1Ob-5 liability, according to the Court, is when the
fiduciary "[pretends] loyalty to the principal
while secretly converting the
368
principal's information for personal gain."
Though the Court did not define fiduciary in the context of the
misappropriation theory, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2 as guidance on the
issue.
According to Rule 10b5-2, a person trading or disclosing material
nonpublic information breaches a fiduciary-like duty of trust or confidence when
she has "agree[d] to maintain [the] information in confidence., 370 Thus, in the
event that an institutional investor agrees to maintain information in confidence
during the course of negotiations with a board, that institution would become a

361. Cf COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DRS., supra

note 2, at 9 ("Shareowners should ... inform themselves about ways to avoid inadvertently raising
Regulation FD concerns.").

362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing how
the SEC "scrutinized, at an extremely heightened level, every particular word used in the statement
[alleged to have been material], including the tense of verbs and the general syntax of each
sentence").
365. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
366. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
367. Id.at 652.
368. Id.at 653 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
369. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2.
370. Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1).
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fiduciary under Rule 10b5-2. 371 This in turn would set the institution up for a
possible insider trading prosecution should it subsequently trade in the issuers'
stock, regardless of whether the trading was based on the information gleamed
during negotiations. 372 Companies and shareholders could attempt to work
around this issue by entering into agreements whereby recipients of confidential
information promise not to trade. However, such agreements are often
unattractive to shareholders because they would seemingly need to be asked to
sign them without learning the nature of the information to be disclosed.373 From
the SEC's perspective, and given the Commission's stated desire to protect
"ordinary" investors, it would further need to address the fact that investors who
sign confidentiality and no-trade agreements can still benefit from selective
disclosure compared to others who do not have access to the relevant
information. For example, recipients of selective disclosure can use the
information to evaluate prospects of competing companies and then gain an
advantage when trading in the securities of those other companies. 374
To address these issues, the SEC should provide additional interpretive or
enforcement guidance concerning the scope of Regulation FD and its
relationship to negotiations between firms and shareholders on governance
matters. Of course, any guidance that is not sufficiently tailored to the issues that
arise during private negotiations runs the risk of presenting the same predictive
difficulties faced by firms trying to determine Regulation FD's application ex
ante. Another possible solution would be to create an additional safe harbor
within Regulation FD that would expressly carve out a space for boards to
negotiate with institutional investors on matters of governance and strategy-an
option recommended by Stephen Davis and Stephen Alogna3 75-or even to
eliminate Regulation FD altogether. However, either option would first require

371. See id.
372. But see SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 724-25 (N.D. Tex. 2009). In this case, the
SEC charged Dallas entrepreneur Mark Cuban with insider trading pursuant to Rule 10b-5 for
selling 600,000 shares of the stock of an internet search engine company on the basis of material
nonpublic information concerning an impending stock offering. Id. at 717-18. Relying on the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability and Rule 10b5-2, the SEC argued that Mr. Cuban
had a duty to refrain from trading once he agreed to keep the information about the stock offering
confidential. Id. at 721. However, U.S. District Court Chief Judge Sidney Fitzwater ruled that an
agreement can give rise to misappropriation liability only if it includes both a duty of confidentiality
and a commitment to refrain from using the confidential information in a trading transaction. Id. at
724. According to the court, "[t]he agreement... must consist of more than an express or implied
promise merely to keep information confidential. It must also impose on the party who receives the
information the legal duty to refrain from trading on or otherwise using the information for personal
gain." Id. at 725. Because the SEC's complaint alleged only that Mr. Cuban's agreement was one of
confidentiality, and not one of confidentiality and non-use, the court dismissed it without prejudice.
Id. at 731.
373. Posting of Annette L. Nazareth to the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance and Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/07/20/sec-vcuban-decision-casts-doubt-on-sec-position-on-insider-trading/ (July 20, 2009, 14:23 EST).
374. Choi, supra note 318, at 565-66.
375. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 1, at 5.
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an internal balancing of policy concerns within the SEC. The Commission would
need to balance its desire for greater levels of corporate transparency against its
insider trading enforcement goals and policies. Additional legislative changes
may further be required in order to address the complications presented by the
0 'Haganmisappropriation theory in the context of confidentiality agreements.
VI. A MODEL OF NEGOTIATIONS

N GOVERNANCE: "SAY ON PAY"

Based on this Article's discussion of the governance and regulatory
implications of private board-shareholder negotiations, it is perhaps useful to
provide a detailed illustration of how specific issues frequently generate an
increasing focus on board-shareholder dialogue. One of the most visible
examples in this regard occurs in the debate over executive compensation.37 6
Even before the financial crisis that began in the fall of 2008, shareholders at
many U.S. companies advocated for reforms in executive compensation. 377 Of
the various reforms discussed, one in particular received significant attention:
shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation, which are commonly
referred to as "say on pay" votes. 378 Say on pay has received the support of the
Council of Institutional Investors, 379 the Interfaith Center for Corporate
Responsibility, 38° RiskMetrics Group, 381 and other policy groups. 382 In its most
basic form, the practice enables shareholders to democratically express their
383
packages at their firms.
approval or disapproval of the executive remuneration 3114
Though say on pay votes are nonbinding on the board, they place considerable
pressure on companies to reform their compensation policies and can even lay
the groundwork for litigation.385 Moreover, as previously discussed, the
pressures to heed shareholder warnings about compensation have grown as an
increasing number of firms adopt majority voting policies for director elections.
These policies make it easier for activists to remove directors who, in their
opinion, underperform or fail to act in the best interest of the company.

376. See, e.g., Eric Dash, Compensation Experts Offer Ways to Help Curb Executive Salaries,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 2006, at C1 (discussing methods for effectively limiting executive pay).
377. See id.
378. See Labaton & Wohl, supra note 262, at 18-20; Gretchen Morgenson, Verizon
Shareholders to Vote on Pay for Top Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C8; Davis, supra
note 271, at 3; Johnson & Summerfield, supra note 134, at 1.
379. See COUNCIL OF INST. INVESTORS, GOVERNANCE POLICES 9 (2009), available at
http://www.cii.org/policies (follow "Full Council Corporate Governance Policies" hyperlink).
380. See Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Policy, http://www.iccr.org/issues/
policy/index.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
381. See RiskMetrics Group, Principles and Board Guidelines, http://www.riskmetrics.com/
guidelines (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
382. See Davis, supra note 271, at 8.
383. See id. at 5.
384. See id.
385. Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/02/
the-sec-from-fraud-accessory-to-quack-corporate-governance.html (Feb. 19, 2009, 06:06 CST).
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Though still relatively new in the United States, say on pay has been a
fixture at corporations in the United Kingdom, which became the first country to
require shareholder advisory votes on compensation in 2003. 386 Recent empirical
work has analyzed the evolution of say on pay in the United Kingdom and
concluded that it has led to an increase in the quantity and quality of dialogue
between directors and institutional investors.3 87 In addition to discussions about
executive pay, large shareholders are now frequently asked to comment privately
on board appointments and other routine governance matters. 388 The research
further found that say on pay has triggered increased responsiveness by boards to
shareholder concerns, slower executive pay growth, and more frequent and welldeveloped remuneration policies that more closely tie pay with company
performance.3 89 U.K. firms now regularly initiate direct outreach to shareholders
on an individual basis, hold annual invitation-only meetings390with their largest
institutional investors, or use a combination of these methods.
The rise in direct board-shareholder dialogue was an almost overnight
phenomenon in the U.K. after GlaxoSmithKline's (GSK) board suffered an
unexpected defeat in 2003. 3 9 1 GSK was the first company to put its proposed
executive compensation package up for a shareholder advisory vote in
accordance with the U.K.'s say on pay regulations.3 92 The package failed with
50.7% of shareholders voting against it.393 Though admittedly nonbinding on the
board, the result triggered widespread negative publicity against the firm and
embarrassment for its directors.
Since that time, the firm holds two annual
roundtable meetings with approximately a dozen institutional investors in both
the U.K. and the U.S. to discuss executive compensation. 9 This example has
led other firms in the U.K. to use negotiations to resolve shareholder concerns
over executive pay prior to a say on pay vote in order
to spare their boards the
3 96
public embarrassment that would result from a defeat.
According to the Association of British Insurers, the level of private
communication between boards and shareholders in the U.K. tripled after GSK's

386. Davis, supra note 271, at 9. After the U.K.'s adoption of say on pay, the countries of
Australia and Sweden followed suit. Id. at 8.
387. See id. at 10-14.
388. Battlingfor CorporateAmerica, supra note 184, at 71.
389. See Davis, supra note 271, at 11.
390. See id. at 10.
391. Id.
392. See Glaxo Defeated by Shareholders,BBC NEWS, May 19, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/

2/hi/business/303838 1.stm.
393. Id.
394. See id ("But the scale of the protest vote proved to be humiliating for the GSK
board .... ); see also Davis, supra note 271, at 9 ("The widely-reported vote result, though non-

binding, proved both a repudiation of GSK's own complacent attitude toward shareowner
communication and an embarrassing hit to the reputations of the firm's directors.").
395. Davis, supra note 271, at 23.

396. See id.
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defeat. 3 9 7 Such communication ranges from phone conversations to multiple

high-level, in-person meetings between institutional investors and directors.39 In
most cases, the negotiations result in boards changing their compensation plans
in ways that more closely link performance with pay.
The increasing levels of communication in the U.K. have also led to fewer
confrontations between boards and shareholders. 400 As indicated in Part II,
activists in the U.S. frequently feel compelled to submit formal shareholder
proposals under Rule 14a-8 before trying direct negotiations with the target
board. 401 These proposals, however, may result in the board taking on a
defensive posture that actually chills private dialogue. 40 2 By contrast, fhnds in
the U.K. now consider formal shareholder proposals as a last resort.40 3 Instead,
the recurring, market-wide nature of the U.K.'s say on pay requirements has led
to sustained dialogue rather than "shotgun exchanges driven by dissent or
crisis." 40 4 This has led many institutional investors in the U.K. to devote specific
departments and personnel to board-shareholder negotiations.40 5
Negotiations may also help to resolve intraboard disputes. For example,
members of firm compensation committees can use information gleaned from
meetings with shareholders if they are asked to explain or defend themselves to
other directors who question why changes were made to pay packages. In other
words, by using the threat of defeat in a say on pay vote as leverage,
compensation committee members will likely face less opposition from other
directors who might initially challenge modifications to remuneration policy.
The rising levels of informal communications between firms and
shareholders stemming from the introduction of say on pay has also caught the
attention of regulators and legislators in the U.K., who now cite the measure as
something
406 that gives British markets a competitive advantage in attracting
capital. The United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry, for example,
stated that say on pay has had the effect of "'enhanc[ing] the competitiveness of
the U.K. economy"' through "'better planning by corporations"' and "'better
dialogue with investors."' 4 7 This sentiment was echoed by authorities at the
London Stock Exchange and by four of the world's largest funds, who wrote to

397. Id. at 10.

398. Id.
399. See id.
400. See id. at 20 ("In Britain... most investors consider the act of submitting a challenge
resolution to an annual meeting as a last and hostile resort following a breakdown in relations with
the company.").
401. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
402. See Posting of Lisa Fairfax to Conglomerate Blog, http://www.theconglomerate.org/
2009/04/shareholder-proposals-and-communication.html (Apr. 21, 2009).
403. See Davis, supra note 271, at 20.

404. Id.
405. Id. at 23.
406. Id. at 14.
407. Id.
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the SEC in favor of mandatory "say on pay" votes as a way to improve the
408
attraction of U.S. markets to foreign capital.
The fact that say on pay in the United Kingdom has led to more frequent and
robust board-shareholder dialogue is noteworthy not only for its description of
the practical effects of private negotiations, but also because it may signal
upcoming developments in the United States. 40 9 Even before the recent financial
crisis, say on pay resolutions were emerging on the annual proxy statements of
U.S. companies with growing regularity. 41° Approximately seventy say on pay
proposals were submitted to public companies during the 2008 proxy season.
These resolutions were supported by an average of 42% of votes, with ten
receiving majority support.
In the 2009 proxy season, as many as 100 say on
pay proposals were submitted to U.S. companies.413
Say on pay has received even greater attention now that regulators have
started shaping their responses to the recent economic crisis. 414 As part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 415 enacted on February 17,
2009, and commonly referred to as the "stimulus bill," all institutions that
receive government financial assistance under the bill must give their
shareholders a say on pay advisory vote on executive compensation during all
periods in which the obligations arising from such assistance remain
outstanding. 416 This means that in its annual proxy statement, each institution
receiving stimulus funds must provide a separate nonbinding shareholder vote to
approve the compensation of the institution's executives as disclosed pursuant to
the SEC's compensation disclosure rules. 4 17 The disclosure must include items
such as a compensation discussion and analysis and compensation tables. 418
These requirements build on public comments made by SEC Chair Mary
Schapiro and several SEC Commissioners who have encouraged companies 4to
19
voluntarily adopt say on pay provisions in light of the financial crisis.

408. Id.
409. Id. at 15.
410. See Posting of Annette L. Nazareth to the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance and Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/02/27/%/oe2 /%80/
9csay-on-pay oe2%80%9d-now-a-reality-for-tarp-participants/#more-901
(Feb. 27, 2009, 11:42
EST).
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. See Orol, supra note 12.
415. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and numerous other titles).
416. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, Exchange
Act Release No. 60,218, 2009 WL 1884113, at *2 (proposed July 1, 2009); see also Orol, supra
note 12 ("The say-on-pay proposal would allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the pay
packages of executives of financial institutions that have accepted funds as part of TARP.").
417. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, 2009 WL
1884113, at *10.
418. Id.
419. See Walter, supra note 2; S.E.C. Commissioner Backs 'Say on Pay,' supra note 2.
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Moreover, as the experience in the U.K. reveals, once shareholders begin voting
on pay, their interest in engaging boards on other matters is also likely to
awaken.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the ever evolving landscape of corporate governance, the continuing trend
toward giving shareholders greater power and voice within firms now enables
them to rely on methods of activism beyond the traditional means of shareholder
proposals, proxy contests, director elections, and litigation. Specifically, as a
corollary to the additional leverage provided by majority voting and other
developments, more and more institutional investors are using private
negotiations with management to effectuate significant changes in firm
governance and strategy.
There are several reasons for this. Once shareholders and boards start
engaging in negotiations, the process has proven highly effective in resolving the
issues that prompted the engagement in the first place. Further, the resulting
dialogue frequently generates several unique benefits to both sides that often
make negotiations more desirable than other forms of interaction. For one,
private negotiations will often be the most cost-effective option available.
Meetings or telephone calls with a target company CEO cost considerably less
than initiating a proxy solicitation campaign or litigation. From the perspective
of companies targeted by activism, they too may experience cost savings in that
private negotiations often lead to withdrawn shareholder proposals-thereby
obviating the need to launch a proxy solicitation campaign of their own-or
preemption of shareholder litigation.
Second, engaging in a private dialogue with a target company will generally
be less hostile and less confrontational than other forms of activism, such as
proxy contests, litigation, or public shaming. Of course, informal mechanisms of
dialogue will only be effective if there are formal enforcement tools available.
However, by beginning with private negotiations, the chance that the parties will
be able to reach common ground on an issue without resort to more
confrontational behavior is significantly increased. This will enable both the
activists and their target companies to keep many disagreements out of the public
domain, thus reducing political or media risk.
An additional benefit of private negotiations is the increased transparency
they provide for shareholders. If activists are to play a role in monitoring agency
costs, they must be in a position to gain access to key inside information at firms
regarding strategy and policies. Companies are more likely to disclose such
information, with appropriate safeguards, in a private setting as opposed to such
public forms as proxy statements and annual reports. Further, by allowing for
greater transparency, regardless of whether shareholder recommended changes
are ultimately adopted by target firms, private negotiations promote the
development of mutual trust between boards and shareholders.
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These benefits all suggest that private negotiations provide value by filling a
governance gap. However, negotiations may never realize their ultimate potential
as a meaningful tool for either shareholders or boards in light of current
regulatory limitations. Specifically, the restrictions on selective disclosure
manifested by the SEC's Regulation FD pose a very real chance of disabling the
free exchange of information that is vital to efficient and productive boardshareholder negotiations. In that sense, Regulation FD stands in direct tension
with the SEC's own stated policy goal of taking action necessary to promote and
encourage more frequent private dialogue between shareholders and directors.
The need to resolve this tension through additional regulatory guidance or
intervention takes on particular import as recent financial reforms appear set to
trigger even more widespread discussions between directors and their largest
shareholders. Thus, while private negotiations have already shown that they have
considerable promise in corporate governance, now it is up to regulators to
decide if they are going to stand in the way or get on board.
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